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Privacy, Accountability, and the
Cooperating Defendant: Towards a
New Role for Internet Access to
Court Records
Caren Myers Morrison
62 Vand. L. Rev. 921 (2009)
Now that federal court records are available online, anyone
can obtain criminal case files instantly over the Internet. But this
unfettered flow of information is in fundamental tension with many
goals of the criminal justice system, including the integrity of
criminal investigations, the accountability of prosecutors, and the
security of witnesses. It has also altered the behavior of prosecutors
intent on protecting the identity of cooperating defendants who
assist them in investigating other targets. As prosecutors and courts
collaborate to obscure the process by which cooperators are recruited
and rewarded, Internet availability risks degrading the value of the
information obtained instead of enabling greater public
understanding.
There is a growing body of scholarship considering the
privacy implications of electronic access, but the literature has not
yet addressed these issues from the perspective of the criminal
justice system. This Article begins to fill that gap by focusing on the
skittish responses of prosecutors and courts to the expanding
availability of information that had always been public but was
traditionally hard to obtain. Such evasion is particularly troubling
in the context of cooperation, an important law enforcement tool that
is essentially unregulated and susceptible to capricious application.
The Article proposes an approach that pairs limitations on online
access with systematic disclosure of detailed plea and cooperation
agreements in their factual context, with identifying data redacted.
This proposal would protect privacy and security, while enabling the
public and press to engage in genuine government oversight.
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INTRODUCTION

In Martin Scorsese's film The Departed,' crime boss Frank
Costello, played by Jack Nicholson, learns that there is a rat in his
crew-someone who is gathering evidence against him for the police.
In order to. uncover the rat's identity, Costello gathers his men in a
bar, orders them to write down their full names and social security
numbers, and then hand delivers the information to his own mole in
the police force for him to look up their records.
He needn't have gone to so much trouble. The federal courts'
electronic public access program, known as PACER, now permits
anyone to access case documents and docket information instantly
over the Internet. 2 It is not even necessary to know the case file
number; a convenient indexing system allows one to search through
criminal cases in every district court in the nation by defendant
name. 3 In The Departed, the rat is actually an undercover cop named
Billy Costigan. But if Costigan had been a cooperating defendant
instead-an individual who pleads guilty and agrees to assist in the
investigation or prosecution of former criminal accomplices in
exchange for sentencing consideration-the crime boss could have
4
done his own checking from his laptop.
1.

THE DEPARTED (Warner Bros. 2006).

2.
The Public Access to Court Electronic Records system is "an electronic public access
service that allows users to obtain case and docket information from Federal Appellate, District
and Bankruptcy courts" over the Internet. PACER Frequently Asked Questions,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter PACER FAQ].
3.
The U.S. Party/Case Index covers every district court. See U.S. Party Case Index: NonParticipating Courts, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/psco/cgi-binlmiss-court.pl (last visited Mar.
30, 2009) (listing the five federal appellate courts, but no district courts, which are not covered by
the index).
4.
This Article focuses solely on cooperating defendants, not confidential informants or
undercover officers. Confidential informants are typically recruited by investigative agencies and
paid in cash rather than leniency. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2002) (explaining that the government

considers confidential informants "on the payroll"); Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation
in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992) (discussing how witnesses who are not
accomplices to the crime might be paid in cash by the government). Undercover officers are not

2009]

INTERNET ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS

923

This innovation has transformed the traditional model of court
access. Federal court records have always been open to public
inspection, 5 but in practice the records were available only to those
with the time and resources to travel to the clerk's office of the district
court to consult individual case files. 6 Committed to paper, locked in
filing cabinets, court records were maintained in a state of "practical
7
obscurity."
The public's newfound ability to summon up any criminal case,
even a closed one, with the click of a mouse would appear to be an
unmitigated victory for the right of popular access to government
information. We value openness in our public institutions--our right
as citizens "to be informed about 'what [our] government is up to,' "8because it helps us understand how these institutions work,
appreciate what they do, and maintain a sense of control over them. In
judicial proceedings, openness has long been recognized as helping to
check the abuse of governmental power, promote the informed
discussion of public affairs, and enhance public confidence in the
system. 9
But this unfettered flow of information is in fundamental
tension with a number of goals of the criminal justice system,
including the integrity of criminal investigations, the accountability of
prosecutors, and the security of witnesses. In order to function
effectively, the system needs zones of shadow where the participants
can deal candidly with each other. If those participants perceive
instead that their actions, as memorialized in court documents such as
plea agreements or sentencing motions, are on display, the process can
become distorted. In response to unwanted scrutiny, prosecutors,
sometimes aided by the courts, will attempt to conceal or disguise the
information they regard as sensitive or confidential.1 0 The result is
defendants at all but instead are police officers or federal agents posing as criminals in order to
obtain evidence. Cf. GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 4-6 (1988)
(describing how the FBI's position changed during the twentieth century from never allowing
agents to engage in illegal activity, regardless of the potential benefit to law enforcement, to
relying on undercover operations as the "cutting edge" of their investigative efforts).
5.
This Article limits its discussion to electronic access in the federal courts because, as a

self-contained system about which we have more information than those of the various states, it
is the most amenable to study. Cf. Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior. Influencing
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852
n.4 (1995) (describing the federal system as "simply more accessible for analysis").
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
8. Id. at 773 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10.- See infra Part I.C.
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that as information becomes more easily accessible, it can also become
less meaningful.
In concrete terms, the ease with which court information can
now be retrieved means that individuals' criminal case records are
available to anyone surfing the Internet. This, in turn, raises what
might be loosely termed the Billy Costigan problem 1 1-the concern
that the identities of cooperating defendants will be discovered
prematurely, jeopardizing their lives and safety as well as the success
12
of law enforcement investigations.
While the most obvious concern is that violence towards
cooperators will increase, 13 the issues raised by electronic access are
not limited to retaliation. Exposure of cooperators' identities, or the
fear of such exposure, entails several interrelated harms. Whether or
not retaliation and intimidation of witnesses and cooperators is
exacerbated by Internet access to court files, the risk alone might
discourage defendants who would otherwise consider cooperating with
14
the government, potentially hampering law enforcement efforts.
The prospect of chilling effects and retaliation has already
caused a shift in behavior among prosecutors and courts. Whereas a
cooperation agreement might previously have detailed the terms of
the bargain between the government and the defendant, some
districts are now experimenting with ways to conceal the nature of
these bargains, either through sealing portions of every plea
agreement or by using conditional boilerplate that sheds very little
light on the rights and duties of the parties.1 5 These practices result in
another kind of harm: a degrading of the information to which there is
now increased access. This is particularly problematic in the context of
cooperator practice. The federal use of cooperators-and to some
11. This is a slight misnomer, of course, because Costigan was an undercover officer rather
than a cooperator. However, the scenario remains emblematic of the problem and arguably
influences the behavior of prosecutors and agents. See infra Part I.C.
12. While the issue of the online dissemination of sensitive private information, such as
home addresses and social security numbers, has been the subject of detailed debate, see, e.g.,
Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and the Question of
Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV. 175, 206-10 (2004)
(considering Internet access to civil and criminal cases), problems specific to cooperation in
criminal cases have not yet been fully examined.
13. Violence against cooperating defendants has been an intractable problem and shows no
signs of abating. See discussion infra note 213 and accompanying text.
14. United States v. Zingsheim, 384 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2004):
Law enforcement agencies may be less likely to cooperate with U.S. Attorneys if they
know that everything they say will be spread on the public record. . . . For that
matter, witnesses and defendants may be less willing to cooperate, for more disclosure
increases the risk of retaliation by their former confederates in crime.
15.

See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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extent the plea-bargaining system in general-suffers from a lack of
transparency, even a lack of basic information, that has persistently
hobbled efforts towards effective public oversight. 16 While purchasing
information and testimony from defendants in return for leniency has
always been an integral part of federal investigations and
prosecutions, 17 it is also a practice that is susceptible to capricious
application, resulting in wide, unjustifiable disparities in the
treatment of cooperators across the country.18 The paradox of
electronic access is that as the ease of accessibility increases, so do the
incentives to compensate for that access by further obfuscation. The
forces that push the practice into the shadows can only be exacerbated
by the fears raised by electronic access to court files.
In addition, the cost to privacy cannot be overlooked. Unlike
the more forgiving world of paper records and fallible human memory,
in cyberspace, nothing is ever forgotten. 19 Information remains
eternally fresh, springing to the screen as quickly years later as it did
on the day it was first generated. If all federal defendants run the risk
of becoming a permanently stigmatized underclass, cut off from
legitimate opportunities of mainstream society, 20 cooperating
defendants are further burdened with potential rejection by their
21
former communities.

16. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 20-21 (suggesting the creation of a standing commission
that would examine and report on cooperation agreements at regular intervals); Daniel C.
Richman, The Challenges of Investigating Section 5K1.1 in Practice, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 75, 76
(1998) [hereinafter Richman, Challenges] (describing the difficulties for outsiders to determine
when cooperation agreements or other discounts are used to reduce sentences); Patti B. Saris,
Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's
Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1997) (characterizing the process by which judges
reduce sentences for cooperation as "largely secret" and typically insulated from appellate
review).
17. Unlike in certain state systems, where many codes of criminal procedure forbid a jury
relying on the uncorroborated word of an accomplice, see, e.g., Bennett v. State, 144 S.W.2d 476,
481 (Ark. 1940), federal prosecutors can bring cases relying solely on cooperating witnesses. See,
e.g., United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1060 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[U]ncorroborated
accomplice testimony may constitutionally provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction."
(citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917))).
18. As Albert Alschuler has observed, "The word 'disparity' can mean either inequality or
difference.... Inequality is another word for 'unwarranted' disparity." Albert W. Alschuler,
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85,
87 n.3 (2005).
19. See infra notes 238-40.
20. See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarcerationand the Proliferationof CriminalRecords, 3 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 387-91 (2006) (describing the cycle of discrimination faced by past
offenders).
21. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation,Punishment, and Atonement,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Simons, Retribution for Rats] (noting that "the 'common
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This Article argues that simply enabling the public and the
press to access criminal court files over the Internet will not
ultimately shed light on the workings of government and is likely to
prove counterproductive. Electronic access and the fears it raises
might increase the disparate ways in which cooperation is
administered, with little hope of remedy. Instead, the twin interests of
public access and the just administration of cooperation bargains
would be better served, not by electronic access to individual criminal
court files, but by systematic disclosure of plea bargains in all cases,
with identifying information redacted. System-wide information could
be a step towards rationalizing and improving what has been an area
particularly resistant to study, and thus to reform.
These suggestions are particularly timely in light of the recent
public debate triggered by the use of PACER information on a website
called Whosarat.com, which maintains thousands of profiles of
cooperators and informants. 22 The site's profiles are legitimized by
their use of court records; otherwise empty allegations that someone is
a "rat low-life informant" 23 are given substance when linked to court
documents, such as plea agreements, that detail the quid pro quo
24
struck between that person and the government.
Concerned that the website would encourage violence against
cooperators, the Department of Justice asked the Judicial Conference
to remove all plea agreements from the PACER system. 25 This
proposal was met with fierce resistance from the public, the press, and
the defense bar. 26 The debate, which the Judicial Conference has for
disdain' in which cooperators are held often means that the cooperator is ostracized not only from
his accomplices, but also from other communities that may be important to him").
22. See Who's A Rat, http://www.whosarat.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
23. Who's A Rat, Informant Profile 495, http://www.whosarat.com/search profiles.php?
keyword=&profile=2&x=43&y=4&start=45Owww.whosarat.com (last visited July 2, 2008).
24. As the site itself notes, "All posts made by users should be taken with a grain of salt
unless backed by official documents." Who's A Rat, About Us, http://www.whosarat
.comlaboutus.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
25. Letter from Michael A. Battle, Dir., Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to James C. Duff, Sec'y, U.S. Judicial Conference (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Battle
Letter] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). The Judicial Conference is "the principal policy
making body concerned with the administration of the United States Courts." U.S. Courts,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
26. In response to the Judicial Conference's Fall 2007 Request for Comment on Privacy and
Security Implications of Public Access to Certain Electronic Criminal Case File Documents,
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/requestcomment.htm, open access proponents argued that
Internet access provides accountability, transparency, and convenience. See, e.g., Comment of
Sandra Baron, Media Law Res. Ctr., Inc., to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to
Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 63, at 4-5
(Oct. 25, 2007) [hereinafter MLRC Comment],
available at www.privacy.uscourts
.gov/2007text.htm; Comment of Rene P. Milam & Guylyn R. Cummins, Newspaper Ass'n of Am.
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the moment declined to resolve, 27 received scant scholarly attention.
But the question-whether records revealing the identity of
cooperating defendants should be accessible over the Internetdeserves scrutiny. The issue of what information should be available
electronically is a pressing one that has attracted the attention of key
actors in the system. Yet current approaches, which range from
untrammeled access to severe clampdowns on information, are
unsatisfying. Because federal court records remain accessible at the
courthouse, 28 unlimited electronic access is not strictly necessary,
either under the Constitution or the common law. This Article is an
attempt to engage with the conflicting values of open access and the
needs of a fair and effective criminal justice system and to forge a
solution that can accommodate both.
The Article starts from the idea that the primary purpose of
electronic access should be to enable the public to understand what
the government is doing. There is no overwhelming public need to
know that a defendant named Billy Costigan is cooperating, so long as
the public understands what the government has traded in order to
secure his cooperation. The recent controversy presents an
opportunity to answer the call of scholars and practitioners to remedy
the lack of insight into the cooperation process. Because the Judicial

et al., to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy
and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 64, at 4-6 (Oct. 25, 2007) [hereinafter NAA
Comment], available at www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm; Comment of Nat'l Ass'n of
Criminal Def. Lawyers, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for
Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 67, at 1-3 (Oct. 26,
2007) [hereinafter NACDL Comment], availableat www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
27. See U.S. Courts, Judiciary Privacy Policy, http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009). As of March 2009, the Judicial Conference simply issued the following statement:
After considering the issue, including the comments received, the Court
Administration and Case Management Committee decided to not recommend that the
Conference change the national policy at this time. Instead, it informed the district
courts of the need to consider adopting local policies while emphasizing that such
policies should be the least restrictive to promote legitimate public access. The
Committee may revisit the issue of a national policy at a later date.
Id.
28.

For the moment, courts continue to maintain paper files. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

COMM. ON COURT ADMIN.

& CASE MGMT.,

REPORT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO

ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (amended Dec. 2006), available at www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm
(recommending that public access to case files in the courthouse not be affected by new policies).
Even if paper records are phased out, each clerk's office can maintain a closed network of court
documents accessible only through terminals at the courthouse, which would mimic the
consultation of a paper file in a more convenient format. See William A. Fenwick & Robert D.
Brownstone, Electronic Filing: What Is It? What Are Its Implications?, 19 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 181, 204 n.84 (2002) (noting that "plans for a kiosk or terminal in
the courthouse that can be used to file pleadings and/or access the electronic files" accompany
most e-filing projects).
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Conference has declined to issue a nationwide standard addressing
Internet access to plea documents, the time is ripe for a constructive
compromise that could limit access but enhance the content of public
information across the country. The goal is not to leave the public in
the dark, but to promote fairness and transparency in the
administration of one of the federal criminal system's most frequently
used, yet least understood, tools.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the tension
between electronic access and the operation of an effective criminal
justice system. This Part discusses how federal cooperation works in
practice and critiques the lack of standards to guide courts and
prosecutors in rewarding cooperation. The resulting disparities will
only increase with rising prosecutorial concerns about the risks of
exposure to cooperating defendants in an online world. By curtailing
prosecutors' ability to shield certain transactions from view, electronic
access ultimately risks causing the public to lose meaningful
information about how sentencing bargains are made. Part II
examines the theoretical foundations of the right of access to court
proceedings and documents, which spring primarily from a political
theory of the First Amendment. This Part also evaluates the Court's
privacy jurisprudence, which provides support for a possible limitation
on access. If the values of informed self-government are not advanced
by the dissemination of information about private citizens that sheds
no light on what the government is doing, the costs of such
dissemination may ultiniately outweigh its benefits. Part III offers
suggestions to reconcile the values of access with those of a fair and
effective administration of justice. It considers the recent debate over
the accessibility of plea agreements over the Internet and evaluates
the different solutions that have been proposed by courts,
practitioners, and the Justice Department. Part III concludes that
electronic information should be treated differently than paper records
because unfettered electronic access causes the participants in the
system to change their behavior in ways that can obstruct, rather than
enhance, public oversight. This Article instead proposes an approach
that would pair limitations on online access to criminal court files
with systematic disclosure of detailed plea and cooperation
agreements in their factual contexts, with identifying data redacted.
This solution would best protect privacy and security while enabling
the public and the press to engage in genuine government oversight.
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I. THE COLLISION OF ELECTRONIC ACCESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

While availability of court records over the Internet has
seemingly fulfilled the promise of public access, it has only
exacerbated the conflict between open access values and the
operational needs of the criminal justice system. These problems are
crystallized in the context of cooperating defendants, 29 where the
government's desire for secrecy is at its height and the consequent
distortions are most pronounced.
A. The Specific Problem of Federal Cooperation
30
For a practice so deeply ingrained in our legal culture,
cooperation engenders an enormous amount of hostility. The
overarching critique is that there is something fundamentally
distasteful about rewarding wrongdoers for informing on their
associates. 31 Because a cooperator's actions cannot easily be reconciled

29. This Article looks only at cooperating defendants in ordinary criminal cases, such as
violent crime, narcotics, and organized crime, not national security or terrorism, where the
government has resorted to a much higher level of secrecy. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Court Declines
Appeal on 9/11 Secrecy, CNN, Feb. 23, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/23/
scotus.terror.secrecy/index.html (reporting that former terror suspect Mohamed Bellahouel and
news agencies were both denied access to Bellahouel's sealed court proceedings).
30. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966):
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, "Courts have countenanced the use of informers
from time immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime
consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely upon them or
upon accomplices because the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly."
(quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1959)). The earliest precursor of
cooperation appears to have been the English medieval practice of "approvement," whereby a
person indicted for a capital crime could elect to become an "approver," confessing his guilt and
attempting to incriminate others in order to obtain a pardon. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1091
(1951). The court had discretion to admit or reject the defendant as an approver. Rex v. Rudd, 98
Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116 (1775). If the approver was admitted as such and the targets were
convicted, the approver was pardoned, but if they were acquitted, the approver was hanged.
Donnelly, supra, at 1091 (citing 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 631 (1899)).

The draconian consequences of failing to convict one's accomplices were so conducive to perjury
that the practice was abandoned. 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN

226 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 1736). Accomplice testimony was thereafter procured by giving a
defendant who turned "king's evidence" or "state's evidence" an equitable right to request a
pardon. Simons, Retributionfor Rats, supra note 21, at 6 & n.l. Eventually, the power to decide
which witnesses could cooperate and testify for the state shifted away from the court to the
prosecutor, where it remains today. Id. at 6 & nn.12-13.
31. This view has been dominant since the nineteenth century. See 2 ERSKINE MAY,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 278 (1864) ("So odious is the character of a spy, that his
ignominy is shared by his employers, against whom public feeling has never failed to pronounce
itself, in proportion to the infamy of the agent and the complicity of those whom he served."). A
minority view holds that cooperation gives some defendants a chance to reject their criminal past
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with our ideals of loyalty,3 2 he is viewed, at best, with ambivalence, if
not outright "aversion and nauseous disdain."33 Nor does the practice
reflect well on the government, which sends a troubling moral
message that the consequences of criminality can be avoided by
betraying more valuable targets.3 4 As one commentator has observed,
"The spectacle of government secretly mated with the underworld and
using underworld characters to gain its ends is not an ennobling
35

one."

Still, we live with the practice because of its usefulness. 36
Cooperators enable the government to investigate and prosecute
criminal organizations that it would otherwise be unable to infiltrate;
without them, we would be limited to prosecuting only the most
visible, low-level crimes. 37 Cooperators can give investigators and

and start a new life. See John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations:The Proper Scope of
the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POLY 423, 453 (1997) (noting prosecutors'
belief that "cooperation with the government reveals something positive about a defendant's
moral worthiness, contrition and prospects for rehabilitation"); Simons, Retribution for Rats,
supra note 21, at 4-5 ("While it is no doubt true that most defendants who cooperate do so (at
least initially) for selfish reasons, there is an occasional defendant for whom the decision to
cooperate is motivated by a genuine desire to make amends for wrongdoing.").
32. George Fletcher posits that loyalty is central to our conception of justice. GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 20-21 (1993). We may feel
aversion to the act of informing, "even when the bad act deserves exposure, because we
appreciate the value of the loyalty itself, apart from the worthiness of its object .... The
argument that the relationship that pursues illegal ends deserves no loyalty fails to separate out
the illegality from the relationship." Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF.
L. REV. 563, 623 (1999). Still, some cooperators may inform on their associates because they
value other relationships more highly, such as those with their children or aging parents.
33. Donnelly, supra note 30, at 1093.
34. See id. at 1094 ("Even confirmed law-breakers have their standards of 'squareness.' To
them the stool pigeon situation is the outstanding proof that law enforcement is not square.
Contempt for law is thus encouraged."); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs
and Benefits of PurchasingInformation from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 292, 292-93 & n.14
(1996) [hereinafter Richman, Costs and Benefits] (noting that cooperation has a negative effect
on deterrence).
35. Donnelly, supra note 30, at 1094.
36. Graham Hughes observed that "most cooperation agreements would be difficult to fit
into any concept of repentance or rehabilitation. These are agreements to sell a commodityknowledge." Hughes, supra note 4, at 13. Nonetheless, Hughes concludes that the "utilitarian
approach is surely the correct one." Id. at 15.
37. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Departingis Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of JudicialRevolt on
"SubstantialAssistance" Departures Follows a Decade of ProsecutorialIndiscipline, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 7, 44 (1999) ("[W]ithout accomplice testimony secured through substantial assistance
agreements, several important categories of serious federal crime would be far more difficult to
prosecute, and many individual cases within those categories could not be prosecuted at all.").
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prosecutors an inside view into a criminal conspiracy,3 8 and, if a case
39
does go to trial, they can help tell a coherent story to the jury.
1. How Cooperators Are Recruited and Rewarded
While local practice varies by district, many cases follow a
similar pattern. A defendant who is considering cooperation will first
attend a proffer session, a meeting between the defendant and his
lawyer, the prosecutor, and one or more investigating agents. 40 During
that and any subsequent proffers, the defendant will typically be
debriefed, not only as to his knowledge of the scheme for which he was
arrested, but also as to his knowledge and involvement in all other
crimes. 41 Because his ultimate object is to receive a motion from the
government to the sentencing court stating that he has provided
"substantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of
another, 42 the defendant will attempt to convince the government that
he is trustworthy and that he has information of value.
If the government perceives that his benefit as a witness and
source of information outweigh the disadvantages of a deal, it will
offer the defendant a cooperation agreement, which typically requires
the defendant to plead guilty, to testify truthfully if asked, to agree to
delay his own sentencing, and to refrain from any other criminal
conduct. 43 In return, the government will agree to make a motion for
"substantial assistance," which enables the court, in its discretion, to
impose a sentence lower than either the advisory sentencing
guidelines or any statutory mandatory minimum or both. 44 The motion
38. See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1391 (1996) ("It is a simple fact that frequently the only persons who
qualify as witnesses to serious crime are the criminals themselves.").
39. See Weinstein, supra note 32, at 595 (explaining that cooperator testimony often
provides "the only complete narrative of a conspiracy whose details would otherwise only be
presented to a jury in incomplete snatches obtained through wiretaps, undercover testimony and
other investigative tools that cannot match an insider's view").
40. For a detailed description of the proffer process, see Gleeson, supranote 31, at 447-50.
41. See, e.g., Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargainingin the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063,
1075 (2006) (explaining that the practice in the District of Columbia requires the defendant to
"tell the government about any past criminal conduct").
42. In the federal system, cooperation is generally not rewarded based on the success of the
government's prosecution. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 37 n.140.
43. Ordinarily, the cooperator is required to plead to the most serious charge to which he
has admitted, or at least a charge commensurate with those faced by the defendants against
whom he may testify. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-27.430 cmt. B(1) (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.420.
44. The government may make the motion pursuant to section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or both. Section 3553(e) grants the district court authority,
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will set forth the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation,
which may consist of simply providing information, agreeing to testify,
giving testimony, or taking an active part in an investigation. 45
Typically, the cooperator's sentence will be delayed until all the other
targets of the investigation have been sentenced. 46 Committing
additional crimes, or being caught in a lie, are usually. considered a
breach of the cooperation agreement and will forfeit the cooperator's
right to a government motion. 47
The government's dependence on the cooperation process and
the contingent nature of the bargain provoke their own critiques.
Because only "successful" cooperation is rewarded, there is concern
that this creates incentives for the cooperator to try to please the
prosecutor, with attendant risks of perjury and false leads. 48 Some
upon motion of the government, to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum "so as to reflect
a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006). Section 5K1.1 gives the court similar
authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K1.1 (2008). The court may then consider, among other things, "(1)... the significance and
usefulness of the defendant's assistance[;] (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of
any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the
defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance." Id. §
5K1.1(a).
45. See Stanley Marcus, SubstantialAssistance Motions: What Is Really Happening?,6 FED.
SENT'G REP. 6, 7 (1993) (describing categories of cooperation).
46. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining how it is in the prosecution's interest to
postpone sentencing for as long as possible so that it can enforce the cooperator's continuing
obligations under the cooperation agreement). Like every other aspect of federal cooperator
practice, this aspect varies by region. In the "rocket docket" of the Eastern District of Virginia,
cooperators are routinely rewarded with a Rule 35(b) motion for resentencing, since sentences
are not delayed. Richman, Challenges,supra note 16, at 77.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
government properly withdrew a substantial assistance motion where the cooperator continued
drug trafficking activities); United States v. Butler, 272 F.3d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding
that the government properly refused to file a substantial assistance motion where the
cooperator threatened the life of his codefendant in jail); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825,
831 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the government's decision to decline filing a substantial
assistance motion where the cooperator was arrested with cocaine base five days after testifying
against his supplier did not violate due process); see also Weinstein, supra note 32, at 585-87
(noting that unsuccessful efforts to cooperate can result not only in the denial of a substantial
assistance motion, but also a potential sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice or
additional criminal liability).
48. See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129, 1147 (2004) ("[A] cooperating
witness ... cannot help but perceive that leniency from the government will depend upon a
successful prosecution."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences
of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952 (1999) (describing interviews
with former prosecutors and defense lawyers in the Southern District of New York indicating
that "cooperators are eager to please" prosecutors and therefore have incentive to lie). But see
Bowman, supra note 37, at 44 (arguing that "no one, on either side of the debate, has any idea
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contend that cooperation has a deleterious effect on the adversary
system, causing lazy or overburdened prosecutors to use cooperation
as a case management tool 49 and reducing defense lawyers to
insignificant roles on the sidelines. 50 Additionally, because a
sentencing court can only depart from the advisory guidelines and,
more critically, may only ignore any applicable mandatory minimum
sentence on motion by the government, critics contend that the
practice shifts too much sentencing power from the courts to the
prosecution.5 1 Finally, some argue that the system rewards defendants
without regard to moral culpability because better informed
defendants with more knowledge to sell are frequently more deeply
immersed in the criminal conduct. This problem is exacerbated in the
context of crimes carrying mandatory minimum sentences, such as
52
narcotics offenses.

how frequently cooperating government witnesses lie, or what is more to the point, whether they
lie more than any other type of witness").
49. See Bowman, supra note 37, at 59 ("When cooperation departures are dispensed in
nearly half of all cases, the substantial assistance motion has ceased to be a closely guarded
method of obtaining needed evidence, and has degenerated into a convenient caseload reduction
tool.").
50. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 32, at 617 (arguing that cooperation "strips away what
little remains of the adversary system" in cases resolved by guilty plea and "marginalizes and
often eliminates the defense lawyer"). Daniel Richman, on the contrary, sees a critical role for
the defense lawyer in helping the would-be cooperator assess his options and evaluate the
trustworthiness of the government attorney. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 69, 73-74, 91-94, 109-11 (1995) [hereinafter Richman, CooperatingClients].
51. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, ProsecutorialDiscretion, Substantial Assistance, and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 177-79 (1994) (arguing that the
government motion requirement should be eliminated). Since judges have complete discretion as
to whether to grant a departure at all, and can control its magnitude, underlying this critique is
the assumption that prosecutors may fail to make substantial assistance motions even when the
defendant has cooperated. Whether this happens often is open to debate; many note that it would
ill serve prosecutors to fail to make these motions without good cause. See, e.g., Gleeson, supra
note 31, at 454-55 (noting powerful institutional incentives for government to foster
cooperation). Indeed, some argue that the problem is not that prosecutors unreasonably withhold
substantial assistance motions but that they are too liberal in handing them out. See, e.g.,
Bowman, supra note 37, at 58 ("[The persistent temptation for prosecutors is not to withhold §
5K1.1 motions from the deserving, but to distribute them liberally in order to facilitate easy
guilty pleas.").
52. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
199, 213 (1993) (observing how under a mandatory minimum regime, "[tihe big fish get the big
breaks, while the minnows are left to face severe and sometimes draconian penalties"). There is
some skepticism, however, about how frequently this type of inversion occurs. See Bowman,
supra note 37, at 50-52 (pointing to critics' lack of evidence that this phenomenon actually
occurs). Since judges have discretion to grant or deny a substantial assistance motion, and
control the magnitude of any such departure, Bowman argues, it would be only "a remarkably
inept jurist" who could not "maintain rough proportionality within a single case if he or she
considers it important to do so." Id. at 53.
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2. Disparities in Administration
The strength of these criticisms is limited by how untested and
uncertain they are. Most of those who write about cooperation,
including this author, are influenced by their former experiences as
participants in the system. Because there is so little empirical
information and available data, the literature is frequently grounded
on the impressionistic and anecdotal. 3 But although no study has yet
been able to reveal how cooperation actually works across the ninetyfour federal districts, every indicator is that it is administered in
54
widely disparate ways across the country.
One of the main problems is a lack of national standards, even
within the Justice Department.5 5 It is undisputed that the government
alone holds the power to make a motion on the basis of substantial
56
assistance, and that its decision, in most cases, cannot be reviewed.
But how much assistance is substantial? The answer seems to depend
on the district in which the defendant is prosecuted. In some districts,
a cooperator must testify before the grand jury or in a court
proceeding in order to qualify for a sentence reduction.5 7 In others, the
prosecutor may give a defendant the benefit of a substantial
assistance departure simply for providing truthful information and

53. See Richman, Costs and Benefits, supra note 34, at 294 ("Because the exchange of
cooperation for sentencing leniency is under-regulated and never the subject of systematic
empirical investigation, the views of every actor or former actor in the system on this issue will
be based on personal experience or anecdote.").
54. See Richman, Challenges, supra note 16, at 75.
55. The Sentencing Guidelines Manual recognizes the fact-specific nature of the inquiry:
"The nature, extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that
must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K1.1 cmt. background (2008). While each U.S. Attorney's Office can establish its own internal
policies regarding substantial assistance, one study found that at least one-third of U.S.
Attorney's Offices did not adhere to their own policies. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H.
KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK
GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 7-8 (1998), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf.
56. The only limit on the government's power is that it may not decline to file a motion for
unconstitutional reasons, such as race, gender, or religious affiliation. See Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that "in both § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 the condition
limiting the court's authority gives the Government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a
defendant has substantially assisted," but that courts can grant relief if the refusal to file a
motion is based on an unconstitutional motive).
57. See Federal Court Practices: Sentence Reductions Based on Defendants' Substantial
Assistance to the Government, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 18, 23-24 .(1998) [hereinafter Sentence
Reductions] (noting that a majority of judges interviewed for the study reported that "providing
testimony leading to the arrest/conviction of others was the primary behavior to warrant a
departure").
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being willing to testify, 58 or even for just being sympathetic, without
providing any assistance at all. 59 In the most demanding districts,
even truthful in-court testimony will not suffice; the cooperator must
participate in undercover operations, engaging in such risky tasks as
wearing a wire, conducting undercover meetings with targets, or
60
making recorded telephone calls.
Even after the government has decided to file a motion for
substantial assistance, there is no guidance on the degree of departure
warranted by the cooperation. Should the government even
recommend a particular magnitude of departure? Some districts do,
while others do not, leaving the entire matter to the discretion of the
sentencing judge. 61 How much credit should the defendant be given for
cooperation? Once again, it depends. Some U.S. Attorneys' offices
recommend a reduction of a specific number of guidelines levels to the
sentencing court. 62 Other offices recommend a percentage discount of
63
anywhere between ten and fifty percent.
Cooperation potentially provides a great benefit to the
successful cooperator, who might ultimately get years off his sentence

58. See, e.g., Brown & Bunnell, supra note 41, at 1072 (explaining that cooperators must at
a minimum "provide a full and complete debriefing about [their] own criminal conduct in the
instant case, as well as information about the criminal conduct of others"); Sentence Reductions,
supra note 57, at 20 (describing a similar practice in "Site A").
59. In one of the few empirical studies made of cooperation practice, prosecutors admitted
to occasionally rewarding defendants for arbitrary reasons, such as finding them "sympathetic."
Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging
and BargainingPractices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 52223, 531, 550 (1992). The authors interviewed prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and probation
officers in three different districts and found that in an appreciable minority of cases, prosecutors
were filing 5Kl.1 motions when there was no substantial assistance. Id. at 513-14, 531, 550. As
the authors point out, "such individually made equity judgments open the door to race, gender,
and social-class bias, notwithstanding the good intentions of individual AUSAs hoping to 'save'
sympathetic defendants." Id. at 535-36.
60. See Lee, supra note 51, at 125-26 (describing how, in the Central District of Illinois,
"the U.S. Attorney's Office will not file a 5K1.1 motion unless the defendant goes undercover and
wears a 'wire' to help law enforcement authorities apprehend other criminals").
61. See, e.g., Richman, Cooperating Clients, supra note 50, at 99-100 & n.108 (describing
practice in the Eastern District of New York and in the District of Columbia).
62. See Saris, supra note 16, at 1046-47 (reporting that in one district "the AUSA will
recommend a two-level reduction for a defendant who agrees to testify against another person,
and a four-level reduction where a defendant participates in an investigation").
63. See, e.g., Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures:
Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 41, 43-44 (1999) (reporting that the
Northern District of Illinois U.S. Attorney's Office "typically insisted upon agreed sentences for
cooperation plea agreements...
[that] typically reflected a 33% or 50% reduction of the
applicable guideline"); Saris, supra note 16, at 1050 (finding a fifty percent reduction in the
District of Massachusetts); Sentence Reductions, supra note 57, at 21, 23 (observing a twenty-five
percent or greater reduction in sentences in "Site D" and up to thirty-three percent in "Site F').
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or even avoid prison altogether.64 But it is a benefit that is unevenly, if
not arbitrarily, bestowed. Any attempt to remedy the situation is
complicated by the fact that we do not even know how many
defendants cooperate. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, which tracks
federal sentencing, keeps statistics on how many substantial
assistance departures are granted at sentencing, 65 but not on how
many are made after sentencing pursuant to Rule 35(b), 6 6 or how
many substantial assistance motions are denied by courts. 67 More
critically, these statistics do not account for occasions when
cooperation is rewarded in ways other than the classic combination of
cooperation agreement and substantial assistance motion, such as
reduced charges or fact bargaining. 68 Thie statistics further fail to

64. See, e.g., United States v. Featherstone, No. 86 CR. 861 (RWS), 1988 WL 142472, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1988) (sentencing a former Westies member, responsible for four murders, to
five years' probation); Joseph P. Fried, Ex-Mob Underboss Given Lenient Term for Help as
Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (reporting that celebrated mob turncoat Salvatore
Gravano was sentenced to five years' imprisonment despite his involvement in nineteen
murders).
65. In 2008, approximately 13.1% of federal defendants, or 10,048 people, cooperated and
received downward departures for substantial assistance. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 30 n.1 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
SOURCEBOOK], availableat http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Table30.pdf.
66. See supra note 46 (describing the use of Rule 35(b) in the Eastern District of Virginia).
In 2000, 1453 offenders received 35(b) sentence reductions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
106 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
15_year/chap3.pdf.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Winters, 117 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing
defendant's appeal of district court's refusal to grant downward departure for substantial
assistance); United States v. Mittelstadt, 969 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); United States
v. Hayes, 939 F.2d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d
1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1990) (same).
68. Fact bargaining involves agreement between the parties as to which facts should be
relied on by the sentencing court and typically involves understatement of critical facts, such as
the weight of narcotics or whether a firearm was used. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 59, at
508-09, 547 (describing fact bargaining as an agreement to stipulate to facts that may not
"accurately represent the defendant's conduct"). While such bargaining runs contrary to the
Sentencing Guidelines' mandate that plea agreements be based on a defendant's actual conduct
in committing the offense of conviction, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a)
(2008) (directing courts to accept only bargains that "reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior"), in practice, "parties can handicap the judge's ability to detect how their recommended
disposition deviates from the Guidelines by managing the information that is revealed during
the presentence investigation." Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a
World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 295 (2005); see also Richman, Challenges,
supra note 16, at 75-76 ("The challenge is for an outsider to figure out exactly when charge
discounts or sentencing fact discounts are used in lieu of § 5KI.1 motions ....
and it is not one
that the Commission or anyone else appears equal to.").
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account for "unsuccessful" cooperators who violate the terms of their
69
agreement and receive no motion.
In addition, the rates of downward departure for substantial
assistance vary widely, from slightly more than one percent in some
districts to more than forty-two percent in others. 70 While this
disparity might be due in part to regional differences in the types of
crimes prosecuted, the composition of the bench, and internal U.S.
Attorney's office policy, there are striking contrasts even in
neighboring U.S. Attorneys' offices. 71 Finally, there appear to be racial
and gender disparities in the rate of substantial assistance motions
and in the magnitude of departures granted, for which there is no
72
apparent satisfactory explanation.
B. What Can Be Revealed Through ElectronicAccess
It was within this unpredictable environment that the federal
courts began experimenting with making information more easily
accessible to litigants and to the public, with concomitant benefits in
convenience, speed, and economy.7 3 While PACER began as a sluggish
dial-up system that provided access to docket information in just a few
districts, 74 today, all ninety-four district courts offer PACER access

69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (giving examples of "unsuccessful"
cooperators).
70. In 2008, the rate of substantial assistance departures among sentenced defendants in
the Eastern District of Oklahoma (1.1%), the District of South Dakota (2.6%), the District of New
Mexico (3.1%), the District of Nebraska (3.7%), the Southern District of California (4.1%), and
the District of Arizona (4.9%) was much lower than in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
the District of Hawaii (both 30.9%), the Southern District of Ohio (31.4%), the District of
Columbia (34.5%), the District of North Dakota (37.1%), and the Eastern District of Kentucky
(42.6%). 2008 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 65, tbl. 26, available at http://www.ussc.gov
/ANNRPT/2008/Table26.pdf.
71. Even in neighboring districts, such as the District of North Dakota (37.1% rate of
substantial assistance departures) and the District of South Dakota (2.6%), the Eastern District
of Kentucky (42.6%) and the Western District of Kentucky (12.7%), or the Middle District of
Pennsylvania (27.4%) and the Western District of Pennsylvania (10.8%), the disparities are
striking. Id.
72. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 55, at 13-14 & n.30 (reporting that AfricanAmericans are approximately eight to nine percent less likely than Caucasians to receive
substantial assistance departures, and Latinos are seven percent less likely). The statistics also
show that when minority defendants do receive substantial assistance departures, the
magnitude of departure is less than for white defendants. Id. at 19 & n.41.
73. See generally Silverman, supra note 12, at 176-78 (tracing the development of
courthouse technology).
74. Early reports on PACER describe it as "agonizingly slow." M.J. Quinn, PACER Today
and Tomorrow: The Court's System Improves with Age, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1994, at 5.
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over the Internet 75 to anyone with a valid registration.7 6 A
complementary system, Case Management/Electronic Case Filing
("CM/ECF"), 77 enables parties to file papers with the court
electronically instead of scanning in paper records.78 These documents
are then available to PACER users, who can access them by clicking
on the links in the docket sheet.7 9 To navigate the system, the U.S.
Party/Case Index allows searches by defendant name in the criminal
index, obviating the need for a user to comb through each file within a
district court's records.8 0
In terms of convenience, accessing court records over the
Internet is a vast improvement over paper records. Before the advent
of PACER, anyone who wanted to consult a criminal case file had to go
to the courthouse, stand in line at the clerk's office, and request the
case file by number. The clerk would then go to the stacks, look for the
case folder, and bring it to the requestor. If the file was misplaced or
had been checked out by a court's chambers, the requestor would have
to come back another day. If the file was found, the person could then
examine the file in the clerk's office or could use the archaic, coinoperated photocopying machine to make copies. If the requestor
wanted a closed file that had been sent to archives, she had to fill out
75. See U.S. Courts, About CM/ECF, www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecfabout.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009). PACER handled over 200 million requests for information in 2006. Access
to Court Information Ever Expanding, THIRD BRANCH: NEWSL. FED. CTS., July 2007, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2007-07/accesstocourts/index.html.
76. Anyone with a name, address, phone number, and e-mail address can register at
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/psco/cgi-bin/register.pl; with a valid credit card, registration is
almost instantaneous. Without a credit card, a user will receive a password by mail. PACER

FAQ, supra note 2.
77. As described by the CMIECF website, "CM/ECF is a comprehensive case management
system that allows courts to maintain electronic case files and offer electronic filing over the
Internet. Courts can make all case information immediately available electronically through the
Internet." CMJECF Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmecflecffaq.html
[hereinafter CMvECF FAQ]. By the beginning of 2008, all ninety-four district courts were using
the system. U.S. Courts, About CM/ECF, supra note 75.
78. Rule 49(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes electronic filing by
incorporating by reference Rule 5(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P.
49(d) & advisory committee's note. Rule 5(e) provides that "[a] court may by local rule permit or
require papers to be filed, signed, or verified by electronic means that are consistent with
technical standards, if any, that the Judicial Conference of the United States establishes .... A
paper filed by electronic means in compliance with a local rule constitutes a written paper for the
purpose of applying these rules." FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e).
79. Documents filed in criminal cases prior to November 1, 2004 only are accessible by the
attorneys of record, but for documents filed on or after that date, any PACER user can view the
docket sheet and filings for all non-sealed cases. CMIECF FAQ, supra note 77. The public access
component of CMIECF can be accessed with the user's PACER login and password; a specific
CMIECF login is only necessary when filing documents with the court. Id.
80. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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a form, then wait several weeks for the file to be retrieved from an offsite storage facility. 81 In short, while court files were then, as now,
publicly available, they were effectively available only to the very
82
patient.
Electronic accessibility takes some of the guesswork out of
identifying cooperators. Because the number of cases that go to trial is
so low,

83

the vast majority of cooperating defendants never testify, and

their identities are not formally disclosed. Indications of their
cooperation can nonetheless subsist in court records and docket
sheets. For thousands of non-testifying cooperators, electronic access
becomes a way by which they can be exposed, not only through
PACER, but also through websites that capitalize on the growing
''84
public hostility to "rats" and "snitches.
There are, of course, numerous informal ways of identifying
cooperators, including unexplained absences from the cellblock, prison
gossip, and "word on the street. ''85 In the notoriously paranoid world of
federal detention centers, most defendants suspect each other of
cooperating, and, in many cases, they are correct. But easy access to
court documents can confirm these suspicions. Typically, the most
revealing documents are the defendant's cooperation agreement or the
81. These observations are based on my experiences as a judicial clerk in the Eastern
District of New York in the late 1990s, before the widespread adoption of PACER.
82. For an entertaining description of how information moved from index cards to the
Internet, see Silverman, supranote 12, at 176-78.
83. The rate of cases resolved by guilty plea is around ninety-six percent. 2008
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 65, fig.C (finding 96.3% of cases resolved by guilty plea in fiscal year
2008).
84. News reports indicate that cooperators, or "snitches," are currently objects of a popular
culture backlash. The "Stop Snitching" campaign was sparked by an underground DVD of
purported drug dealers threatening violence against informants, Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch
Campaign Riles Police, Prosecutors,USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at 1A, and quickly gained the
attention of the national media. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin' (CBS television broadcast
Apr. 22, 2007); America's Most Wanted: Gang Violence Boston Special Edition (FOX television
broadcast Feb. 11, 2006). Though the "Stop Snitching" movement initially targeted individuals
who sought to cooperate with law enforcement by implicating others in exchange for leniency,
the campaign against snitching has become more expansive and is now aimed even at witnesses
and family members of crime victims. Richard Delgado, Police and Race Law Enforcement in
Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (2008) (book
review). Furthermore, the prohibition on snitching applies "not just when the crime is minor,
such as drug possession, but also when it is major, such as homicide." Id. In Baltimore and
Boston, where the "Stop Snitching" message has been heavily espoused by rappers and gangs,
"prosecutors estimate that witnesses face some sort of intimidation in eighty percent of all
homicide cases." David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at Al.
85. Proponents of unlimited access contend that these informal risks of exposure eclipse
that of court records. See NACDL Comment, supra note 26, at 6 ("Jailhouse gossip and 'word on
the street' are far more likely sources of information for persons intending harm to a witness"
than plea agreements accessible on PACER.).
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government's substantial assistance motion. Certain other documents,
such as letters from the government to delay sentencing until an
investigation is concluded or until all codefendants and other targets
86
are sentenced, can also be strong indicators of cooperation.
Even if these documents are filed under seal, the sealing itself
may serve as a "red flag" of cooperation.8 7 In addition, sealing is
disfavored in most jurisdictions,8 8 and a sealed motion or a motion to
seal a proceeding must itself be part of the public record.8 9
More generally, a docket sheet can also reveal cooperation, a
fact that is not lost on criminal defendants looking to identify those
who might have informed against them. 90 Sometimes the information
is unambiguous, such as docket entries explicitly identifying
government motions for substantial assistance. 91 More often, docket
86. This can mean that some cooperators plead guilty years before they are ever sentenced.
This too can be a "flag" for any person with familiarity with the federal system. See
Memorandum from John R. Tunheim, Chair, Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt. & Paul
Cassell, Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law, to Judges, U.S. Dist. Courts & U.S. Magistrate Judges
1-2 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.aclutx.org/files/memo%20on%20whosarat.pdf (noting
that motions to reschedule sentencing hearings might reveal cooperation).
87. A study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center into remote public access to criminal
court files in eleven pilot districts found that most practitioners believed that "a sealed document
or a sealed hearing prior to sentencing may be evidence of cooperation by the defendant." DAVID
RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REMOTE PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CRIMINAL CASE RECORDS:
A REPORT ON A PILOT PROJECT IN ELEVEN FEDERAL COURTS 26 (2003), http://www.fjc.
gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/remotepa.pdfl$file/remotepa.pdf [hereinafter PILOT PROJECT REPORT].
88. See, e.g., United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the
power to seal court documents "is one to be very seldom exercised, and even then only with the
greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very clear and apparent reasons").
89. The law in the majority of circuits requires that if a document is filed under seal, there
must be a notation of the sealing on the docket sheet. See, e.g., In re Application of The Herald
Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The motion itself may be filed under seal, when
appropriate, by leave of court, but the publicly maintained docket entries should reflect the fact
that the motion was filed .... "); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 1982) ("A
motion requesting closure of pretrial criminal proceedings will at some point be entered in the
docket."). The Herald court noted that "[e]ntries on the docket should be made promptly,
normally on the day the pertinent event occurs," although it allowed for delayed docketing in
"extraordinary situations." 734 F.2d at 102-03 & n.7.
90. "Some incarcerated clients advise me that they are under tremendous pressure from
other inmates to produce their docket sheets for indications of cooperation." Comment of
Judiciary Employee to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for Comment
on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 3 (Aug. 31, 2007), available at
www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm; see also Comment of Karen Moody, Chief, Prob. &
Pretrial Servs., Dist. of Maine, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for
Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 46 (Sept. 23, 2007),
available at www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm (noting that local practice prohibits inmates
from having court paperwork in their possession "because they are 'shaken down' by other
inmates who want to read their documents in order to determine whether they are cooperating").
91. This is surprisingly frequent. A search of Westlaw's district court docket sheet database
(DOCK-DCT-ALL), which collects information from PACER and repackages it in text-searchable
form, turned up 3277 cases where the term "substantial assistance" appeared in docket entries,
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sheet information can be "read" for markers of cooperation, such
sealed documents and proceedings around the time of a plea
sentence, an unusually long delay between a plea and sentence,
missing document numbers, 92 all of which are strongly suggestive
cooperation.

as
or
or
of

C. What Might Be Lost
The perceived risks of electronic access give prosecutors and
defense counsel greater incentives to avoid the combination of
cooperation agreement and motion for substantial assistance, and
instead to bargain for other, less visible benefits. If prosecutors begin
to fear that fewer defendants are willing to cooperate and that they
might lose evidence, some may feel pressure to "sweeten the deal" by
promising benefits that circumvent public exposure. These can include
charge bargaining, which effectively conceals any sentence
reductions; 93 fact bargaining, which "often involves misleading the
court and the probation department";94 dismissing federal charges and
referring the cooperator's case for state prosecution; 95 or simply
agreeing not to oppose a downward departure motion by the defense.
And circumvention, "unlike overt downward departure, is hidden and

and 5874 cases where the term "5K1" appeared. Only 606 docket sheets contained the term
"3553(e)," the statutory basis for downward departure for substantial assistance to the
government. Nor were these docket entries subtle. Many of them state, 'Motion by United States
of America for Substantial Assistance as to [full name of defendant]," or words to that effect.
92.

See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 87, at 26:

If [a substantial assistance] motion is filed under seal, it may be accompanied by a
docket entry that describes a sealed motion. Alternatively, that sealed motion may not
be recorded in the online docket. The result is a skip in the numbering of docket
entries, which may be taken as evidence that a sealed document was filed with the
court.
93. A charge bargain is a deal where the government allows a defendant to plead to a lesser
crime than would otherwise be provable, or to which the defendant has admitted, obviating the
need for a motion for sentence reduction. See Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity,
Disparity and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921, 959 (2002)
[hereinafter Simons, Departing Ways] (noting that charge bargaining, while not lawless, "hides,
or at least disguises, the sentencing reduction"); see also Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 59, at
539-42 (describing how, in one district, charge reductions were routinely used in lieu of
substantial assistance motions; local probation officers estimated that this occurred in fifty
percent of cooperation cases).
94. Simons, Departing Ways, supra note 93, at 959; see also supra note 68 and
accompanying text (describing fact bargaining).
95. A 1998 study by the Sentencing Commission found that, in the district with the fewest
substantial assistance departures, the government regularly engaged in charge bargaining "that
allowed defendants to plead to lesser charges or referred the case to state/local courts for
prosecution." Sentence Reductions, supra note 57, at 26.
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unsystematic. It occurs in a context that forecloses oversight and
96
obscures accountability."
In some districts, the courts themselves are finding ways to
camouflage cooperation agreements. The District of North Dakota has
implemented a policy that requires prosecutors to file a generic plea
agreement with no references to cooperation as well as a sealed "plea
supplement." 97 The sealed supplement either contains a cooperation
agreement or a statement that there is no cooperation agreement. 98
Therefore, to anyone accessing records over the Internet, "every plea
in North Dakota will appear identical: plea agreement void of
cooperation language and sealed plea supplement." 99 Whether or not
such a blanket sealing policy could withstand a legal challenge, 10 0 the
policy leaves one with the uneasy feeling that even the pretense of
keeping the public informed about the disposition of criminal cases
has been abandoned.
Similarly, in New Hampshire, certain plea agreements contain
boilerplate language conditionally referring to cooperation, 10 1 making
it impossible to determine by reading the plea agreement whether a
defendant is cooperating or not. These "hide in plain sight" approaches

96. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 557.
97. Comment of Rob Ansley, Clerk of Court, Dist. of N.D., to the Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case
Files, Comment 6 (Sept. 11, 2007), available at www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm. Ansley
writes that his district would be implementing a policy change that would mandate that "all plea
agreements" would be filed as "public (unsealed) documents, sanitized by the drafter (USA) of
any references to cooperation." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding
that a state statute mandating blanket provisional sealing of all criminal cases which did not
result in conviction violated the First Amendment); CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823,
826 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Confidence in the accuracy of its records is essential for a court .... Such
confidence erodes if there is a two-tier system, open and closed. If public records cannot be
compared with sealed ones, all of the former are put in doubt.").
101. In the District of New Hampshire, many plea agreements contain the following
paragraph:
If the defendant provides substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the United States may file a motion
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) advising the sentencing Court of
all relevant facts pertaining to that determination and requesting the Court to
sentence the defendant in light of the factors set forth in § 5K1.1(a)(1)-(5).
E.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Campos, No. 08-Cr-40 (D.N.H. June 2, 2008), available at
https://ecf.nhd.uscourts.gov/docl/1171490967; Plea Agreement, United States v. Nguyen, No. 07Cr-51 (D.N.H. Feb. 29, 2008), available at https://ecf.nhd.uscourts.gov/docl/1171450670; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Mesa, No. 07-Cr-210 (D.N.H. Feb. 20, 2008), available at
https://ecf.nhd.uscourts.gov/docl/1171446438.
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might help preserve the security of cooperators, but they undermine
public oversight and understanding.
This is exactly what the system does not need. One judge, well
before the migration of federal court records to the Internet, already
denounced the substantial assistance motion as "unprincipled,
undocumented, unreviewable, and secret."'10 2 Adopting measures like
these, despite their prophylactic utility, can only add to the unhealthy
obscurity that shrouds the practice. What is needed is more
information, not less, in order to achieve public oversight and
maintain some rough proportionality in the process.

II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ACCESS
The body of law that granted the public and press an
affirmative right of access to court proceedings was premised on the
ideal of democratic self-government. Court proceedings have been held
in public since the earliest days of the common law,
not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but
because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act
satisfy
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able1 0to
3
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.

It is to these concerns that the Article now turns.
A. The Right to Informed Self-Government
Proponents of online access frequently couch their arguments
in terms of the First Amendment, an approach that comes with a rich
set of rationales. Open access to judicial proceedings is said to
10 4
encourage a sense of responsibility on the part of public servants,
1
0
5
and enhance the appearance of
facilitate community catharsis,

102. Saris, supra note 16, at 1062.
103. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (Holmes, J.).
104. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980):
Both Hale in the 17th century and Blackstone in the 18th saw the importance of
openness to the proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of
participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse
of judicial power.").
105. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of
criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamental,
natural yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution. The crucial
prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no
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fairness that is necessary to public confidence. 106 Above all, it enables
the informed discussion of matters of public interest. Yet despite the
fervor with which the First Amendment is currently invoked to justify
continued electronic access to court records,10 7 the recognition of an
affirmative right of access to judicial information is of fairly recent
vintage and has never been extended to a right to receive information
8
in a particular medium. 10
1. The Supreme Court
Until 1980, when the Supreme Court decided Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,10 9 the suggestion that the First
Amendment could be used to demand openness from the government
or to vindicate an independent "right to know" had encountered stiff
resistance from the Court. 110 The year before Richmond Newspapers
community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert
manner."
(quoting the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959)).
106. See id. at 595 ("Public access is essential ... if trial adjudication is to achieve the
objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.").
107. See, e.g., NACDL Comment, supra note 26, at 2 ("Depriving the public of access to court
records at any stage of the criminal process has been viewed by the federal judiciary as a
paramount risk to the fundamental principles of our constitutional government."); MLRC
Comment, supra note 26, at 3 ("The proposed blanket policy of denying Internet access to all plea
agreements... offends the public's First Amendment right to access judicial records ....
").
108. See, e.g., Mayo v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 9 F.3d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the operator of an electronic bulletin board service was not entitled to direct personal access
to the Printing Office's electronic bulletin board containing Supreme Court slip opinions);
Westbrook v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 387-88 (App. Ct. 1994) (finding that
the seller of criminal background information was not entitled to periodic copies of computer
tapes from the municipal court information system). The Mayo court, which considered a claim
under the common law, held that the public's right to information did not mean "that a citizen
has the right to obtain free of charge in the form he desires public records that are readily
available in another form," in other words, paper copies at the library. 9 F.3d at 1451.
109. Richmond Newspapers, for the first time, held that the First Amendment granted a
qualified right of public access to criminal trials. 448 U.S. at 580.
110. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ('The right to speak
and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information."). In Zemel, the Court rejected a U.S.
citizen's claim that the State Department's restrictions on travel to Cuba burdened his First
Amendment rights to see conditions there for himself. Id. at 16. The Court hewed to this
rationale over the next decade. In a series of cases involving regulations restricting press access
to prisons, the Court rejected news organizations' claims that the burden on their ability to
gather news violated the First Amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974)
(upholding a prison regulation preventing press from conducting interviews with specific
prisoners at California state prisons); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)
(applying Pelts reasoning to similar federal prison regulations); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (plurality opinion) (restricting access to a prison area where an inmate had
allegedly committed suicide did not violate the First Amendment). The prison access cases were
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was decided, a divided Court had upheld the exclusion of the press
from a pretrial suppression hearing in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.111
The Court held that the constitutional guarantee of a public trial was
"personal to the accused" 112 and conferred no right of access to pretrial
proceedings that could be enforced by the public or the press. 113 This
appeared to close the door on an independent public right of access to
4
judicial proceedings."
Nonetheless, an opposing perspective, primarily championing
the First Amendment as intimately linked to the processes of
republican self-government, was gathering strength. This doctrine,
most powerfully elaborated by Alexander Meiklejohn," 5 had already
taken root in eloquent dissents," 6 dicta," 7 and public opinion." 8 In

widely viewed as constituting "the most explicit repudiation of the argument that the First
Amendment might be wielded as a sword of access to a criminal trial or other governmentcontrolled information." Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse" The First Amendment
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 250 (1995).
111. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979).
112. Id. at 379-80. Although Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, gave a ceremonial nod in
the direction of "the strong societal interest in public trials," id. at 383, he concluded that "the
public interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation." Id. at 384.
113. Id. at 385. The Court decided the case on the basis of the Sixth Amendment, rather than
the First Amendment. Id. at 391.
114. See Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First
Amendment as Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 ("The decision in Gannett was widely perceived,
and deplored, as a drastic reduction on access to a traditionally open institution.").
115. Meiklejohn is credited with crystallizing what is now the classic justification for the
First Amendment as derived "from the necessities of self-government by universal suffrage."
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1948).

For Meiklejohn, the First Amendment was essentially political in nature. "The guarantee given
by the First Amendment ...is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon
issues with which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to consideration of matters of public
interest." Id. at 94. While he did not address directly questions of public access to government
proceedings, the import of his thinking is clear: "The primary purpose of the First Amendment is,
then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our
common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant
information, may be kept from them." Id. at 88-89.
116. The most notable example was Justice Powell's dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
one of the prison access cases, arguing that what was at stake was "the societal function of the
First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs." 417 U.S. 843, 862
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). In Justice Powell's view, the First Amendment "embodies our
Nation's commitment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course
for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues. And public
debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed." Id. at 862-63. Justice Powell
acknowledged Meiklejohn's contribution to the idea that " '[t]he principle of the freedom of
speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.' " Id. at 862 n.8 (quoting
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 115, at 26). Justice Steven's dissent in Houchins echoed the theme that
the First Amendment "serves an essential societal function. Our system of self-government
assumes the existence of an informed citizenry." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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retrospect, Gannett probably provided the impetus the doctrine needed
to flower. 119 A year to the day after the Gannett decision was handed
down, the Court located a right of access to criminal trials "implicit in
the guarantees of the First Amendment."'120 Although the opinion of
the Court 121 gave an extensive survey of the history of the public
trial, 122 the more potent justification was that the "expressly
guaranteed freedoms" in the First Amendment "share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to
1 23
the functioning of government."
Justice Brennan's concurrence, drawing on various proponents
of the political theory of the First Amendment,1 24 argued that the First
Amendment "embodies more than a commitment to free expression
117. See, e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383 (noting the "strong societal interest in public trials");
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("Without the information provided by the
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to
register opinions on the administration of government generally."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
539 (1965) ("The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs ....
").
118. The Gannett decision sparked a wave of controversy as district courts took it "as a broad
license to close courtrooms." Lewis, supra note 114, at 14. The press reaction was predictably
critical. See, e.g., Editorial, Private Justice, Public Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1979, at A16
("Now the Supreme Court has endorsed secrecy in language broad enough to justify its use not
only in a pre-trial context but even at a formal trial."). What was more unusual was that many of
the Justices responded to the criticism personally in a flurry of post-Gannett interviews and
appearances. See, e.g., Burger Suggests Some Judges Err in Closing Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1979, at A17; Linda Greenhouse, Powell Says Court Has No Hostility Toward Press, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1979, at A13; Linda Greenhouse, Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1979, at 41; Walter H. Waggoner, Brennan Protests Criticism by Press, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1979, at B6.
119. Some commentators were of the opinion that "Gannett in fact helped significantly to
create the conditions for Supreme Court acceptance of a doctrine of public access to public
institutions under the First Amendment." Lewis, supra note 114, at 14.
120. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion).
The speed with which the Court reversed course prompted Anthony Lewis, referring to Hamlet's
mother, to observe: "Not since Gertrude has anyone posted with such dexterity from one set of
sheets to another." Lewis, supra note 114, at 1.
121. While seven of the Justices concurred in the result, Richmond Newspapers was a
particularly fractured decision in terms of its rationale, resulting in seven separate opinions.
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, see 448 U.S. at 604-06; Justice Powell took no part in the
case. "Despite the near unanimity of the result," wrote Lillian BeVier, "the Court was unable to
present even the faqade of a unifying rationale." Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the
Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 313 (1982).
122. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-75 (recounting the origins of the modern
criminal trial).
123. Id. at 575. As one commentator noted, "The words could have been Meiklejohn's." Lewis,
supra note 114, at 16.
124. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 93-94 (1980); THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 115; Robert Bork,

Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971)).
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and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
structuralrole to play in securing and fostering our republican system
125
of self-government."'
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 26 a
majority of the Court struck down a state statute requiring courtroom
127
closure during the testimony of minor victims of sexual offenses.
The Court adopted Justice Brennan's view that "the First Amendment
serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate
in and contribute to our republican system of self-government"'128 and
noted that "the institutional value of the open criminal trial is
recognized in both logic and experience.' 2 9
The Court extended the right of access beyond criminal trials
30
proper to voir dire in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
observing that openness "enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system."' 3' In its last major case on the public right
of access, also called Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,132 the
Court formulated a two-part test to determine whether the public has
a right of access to government information: first, "whether the place
and process have historically been open to the press and general
public"'133 and second, "whether public access... plays a particularly
34
significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process."' If

125. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Brennan suggested that the right of access should be informed by "two helpful
principles": first, whether a particular process had been historically open, because "a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience," and second, whether access furthered
the functioning of the process. Id. at 589.
126. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
127. Id. at 610-11. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Brennan.
128. Id. at 604 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
129. Id. at 606.
130. 464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise1]. The case involved the rape
and murder of a teenage girl; the trial was highly publicized and the attempt to find an impartial
jury took six weeks. Id. at 503.
131. Id. at 508.
132. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
II]. The Press-Enterprise Company sought access to the transcript of the forty-one day
preliminary hearing in the case of Robert Diaz, a nurse who had allegedly murdered twelve
patients at the hospital where he worked. The Court noted the "'community therapeutic value' of
openness," particularly in the context of violent crimes, which "provoke public concern, outrage,
and hostility." Id. at 3, 13 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570
(1980)).
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 11. This was a return to Justice Brennan's "two helpful principles" from
Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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both parts of the test are satisfied, closure is subject to a form of strict
135
scrutiny.
2. The Lower Courts
After the Supreme Court's spate of public access cases, the
federal courts of appeals extended the First Amendment right of
access beyond criminal trials and pretrial hearings to other phases of
the criminal process. As one court put it, "It makes little sense to
recognize a right of public access to criminal courts and then limit that
right to the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, something that occurs
in only a small fraction of criminal cases."'1 36 Accordingly, the courts of
appeals have found a First Amendment right of access to bail
hearings, 37 suppression hearings, 138 guilty pleas, 139 and sentencing
40
hearings.
Whether there is a First Amendment right of access to judicial
documents remains open to question. The Supreme Court's only
explicit pronouncement regarding a right of access to judicial
documents was couched in terms of the common law: "[T]he courts of
this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public
14
records and documents, including judicial records and documents." '
Moreover, "the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not
absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and
files, and access has been denied where court files might have become
142
a vehicle for improper purposes."'

135. Court proceedings cannot be closed "unless specific, on the record findings are made
demonstrating that 'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.' " Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Press-EnterpriseI, 464 U.S.
at 510).
136. In re Application of The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1984).
137. E.g., Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988); In re
Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354,
363-64 (5th Cir. 1983).
138. E.g., Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 98; United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1171 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
139. E.g., United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir.
1988); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
140. E.g., Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 191-92; United States v. Eppinger, 49 F.3d 1244, 1253 (7th
Cir. 1995); Wash, Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389.
141. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). In Nixon, Warner wanted to
copy and sell the secret recordings made by President Nixon in the White House, but the Court
held that the common law right of access did not authorize release of the tapes, finding the
existence of the Presidential Recordings Act to be dispositive. Id. at 606-07.
142. Id. at 598.
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Still, most circuits have found a qualified First Amendment
144
right of access to court documents, 143 including plea agreements,
sentencing motions, 145 and other filings. 146 Some courts have further
held that access to docket sheets is constitutionally protected as well.
In United States v. Valenti,14 7 the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a
practice in the Middle District of Florida of maintaining two docketing
systems in criminal cases, one sealed and one public, as "an
unconstitutional infringement on the public and press's qualified right
148
of access to criminal proceedings."'
Faced with a similar practice in Connecticut state court, 49 the
Second Circuit held that there was a qualified First Amendment right
to inspect docket sheets, 50 stating:

143. The only circuits that have not yet recognized a First Amendment right of access to
judicial documents are the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. The Eleventh Circuit appears to be
on the fence. Compare United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d 1388, 1390 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
public has a First Amendment right to see and hear that which is admitted in evidence in a
public sentencing hearing."), with United States v. Kooistra, 796 F.2d 1390, 1391 n.1 (11th Cir.
1986) ("[T]his case may be governed by the somewhat less zealously protected common law right
to inspect and copy court records.").
144. E.g., In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008); Wash. Post v.
Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d
1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); Haller, 837 F.2d at 86; Wash. Post, 807 F.2d at 390.
145. E.g., Wash. Post, 807 F.2d at 390 (documents filed in connection with plea and
sentencing hearings); CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1985) (documents
filed in connection with motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35).
146. E.g., United States v. Eppinger, 49 F.3d 1244, 1253 (7th Cir. 1995) (criminal
proceedings and documents); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 505 (1st Cir. 1989)
(judicial records and documents); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of
Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (documents filed in support of a search warrant); In re
N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (documents filed in connection with a
suppression hearing); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1985) (pretrial
documents); United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial exhibits); In re Globe
Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 1984) (documents filed in support of the parties'
arguments at bail hearings); Associated Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1983) (bill of particulars).
147. 987 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 715. The practice apparently did not die, because the court revisited the issue
twelve years later in United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2005). In that
case, the defendant sought to unseal documents, including motions, relevant to cooperating
codefendants. One of the potential witnesses, who was never called at trial, had a separate
criminal case that was filed entirely under seal. Id. at 1024-25 & n.5. Although the docket sheets
had been unsealed by the time of the appeal, the court had to "remind the district court that it
cannot employ the secret docketing procedures that we explicitly found unconstitutional in
Valenti." Id. at 1029.
149. In Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2004), two Connecticut
newspapers challenged the state court practice of sealing certain docket sheets as well as entire
case files in civil cases.
150. Id. at 96.
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[Tihe ability of the public and press to attend civil and criminal cases would be merely
theoretical if the information provided by docket sheets were inaccessible. In this
respect, docket sheets provide a kind of index to judicial proceedings and documents,
and endow the public and press with the capacity to exercise their rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment. 1 5 1

Therefore, if the First Amendment protects the public's right to access
court documents and docket sheets, at least in some circuits, Internet
access cannot be limited without maintaining the availability of these
records at the courthouse.
B. Privacy as a Possible Limitation on Access
As discussed above, information in court records, while
nominally accessible to the public, had previously led a life of mostly
undisturbed repose. Because of the costs associated with finding and
copying this information, it existed in a state of "practical
obscurity." 152 This lessened concerns that private information would
be disclosed wrongly to the public. Today that picture has changed. As
Daniel Solove has observed, "[I]n light of the revolution in accessibility
provided by modern computer capabilities and the Internet, we must
153
rethink the accessibility of the information in public records."
1. The Emergence of Informational Privacy
Although the word "privacy" has powerful, almost visceral
connotations,1 5 4 its meaning is elusive.1 55 Courts have equated privacy

151. Id. at 93. To date, none of the other circuits has reached the question.
152. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
153. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN L. REV. 1393, 1456 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy and Power].
154. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS 33 (1973) ("There is widespread belief that personal privacy is essential to our wellbeing-physically, psychologically, socially, and morally."); William H. Rehnquist, Is an
Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fairand Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1974) (" 'Privacy' in today's lexicon is a 'good' word; that which increases privacy is
considered desirable, and that which decreases it is considered undesirable. It is a 'positive'
value."). Conversely, "When we contemplate an invasion of privacy-such as having our personal
information gathered by companies in databases-we instinctively recoil." Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy].
155. As Lillian BeVier has observed, "Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to
designate a range of wildly disparate interests-from confidentiality of personal information to
reproductive autonomy-and connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is
being asserted in its name." Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of
Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for PrivacyProtection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
455, 458 (1995) [hereinafter BeVier, Privacy Protection].
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with secrecy, 156 personal autonomy, 157 and freedom from unreasonable
government searches. 158 Today, even though people are more
concerned with privacy then ever, the most salient fact about privacy
may be "'that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.' "159
The modern understanding of privacy can be traced back to
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famed article, The Right to
Privacy,160 which defined privacy as "the right 'to be let alone'"161 and
spurred courts and legislatures to create a variety of torts to protect
these newly identified interests. 162 In 1960, Dean William Prosser
classified the hundreds of cases so generated into four distinct causes
of action, 16 3 one of which, public disclosure of private facts, echoes the
156. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (concluding that there is no
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed since numbers are not kept secret); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (finding that the fundamental right to privacy is
violated when trade secrets are stolen).
157. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that the right to
privacy protects the use of contraceptives by married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy protects the use of contraceptives by unmarried
couples); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy protects the
decision to have an abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the right
to privacy protects sexual relations of gay couples).
158. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) ("[S]urgical intrusion into an
individual's body... implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the
intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime."); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that unreasonable searches are forbidden by the
Fourth Amendment for the sake of "human dignity and privacy").
159. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 154, at 480 (quoting Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman ed., 1984)). Solove proposes a conception of privacy encompassing information
collection, dissemination, and processing, as well as intrusion into people's private affairs. See id.
at 490-91. Employing Solove's categories, the privacy concerns raised by electronic access to
court records from the point of view of cooperating defendants include aggregation ("the
combination of various pieces of data about a person"), identification ("linking information to
particular individuals"), insecurity ("carelessness in protecting stored information from leaks and
improper access"), secondary use ("the use of information collected for one purpose for a different
purpose without the data subject's consent"), disclosure ("the revelation of truthful information
about a person that impacts the way others judge her character"), and increased accessibility
("amplifying the accessibility of information"). Id.
160. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV L. REV. 193
(1890). The central thesis of their article was that existing law did not adequately protect privacy
and that new legal concepts were needed to do so. See id. at 197-98.
161. Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
162. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 153, at 1432.
163. The causes of action were intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and appropriation. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). These
categories were adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the four recognized privacy
torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E (1977). The definition of
publicity given to private life, or invasion of privacy, is publicity of a matter concerning the
private life of another "if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Id. § 652D.
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current concern in the electronic age for informational privacy, or
16 4
"freedom from unwanted disclosure of personal data.'
The Supreme Court's recognition of a constitutional right to
privacy was originally grounded in an understanding of privacy as
involving the right to make important choices in personal matters free
from government interference, 165 sometimes referred to as decisional
privacy.166 But the Court quickly acknowledged a related right, closer
to the unwanted disclosure of personal facts, of what is now termed
informational privacy. In Whalen v. Roe, 16 7 the Court recognized that
the constitutional protection of "privacy" involves two distinct but
related interests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters"'168 and "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.' 69
In Whalen, a group of doctors and patients challenged the
constitutionality of a New York statute that required doctors to
disclose the names and addresses of all patients for whom they had
prescribed certain drugs with a potential for abuse, which the state
would maintain "in a centralized computer file."'170 The appellees
claimed that the statute impaired both their decisional and
7
informational privacy interests.' '

164. BeVier, Privacy Protection,supra note 155, at 458.
165. See supra note 157 (listing cases). Although "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy ... the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
166. Arguably, this right is more accurately viewed as protecting personal autonomy.
167. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
168. Id. at 599. The Court revisited this aspect of privacy in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), in which the Court acknowledged that President Nixon
probably had a constitutionally protected privacy right in some of the recordings he had made at
the White House, even though it was preempted by the Presidential Recordings Act. See id. at
457.
169. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
170. Id. at 591.
171. Id. at 600. Specifically, they argued that because the information about their use of the
drugs existed "in readily available form," they had a genuine concern that the information might
become public, which in turn, led them to be reluctant to prescribe and use the drugs even when
medically indicated. Id. As Daniel Solove noted, the risk of disclosure itself led to the
interference with their decisional privacy. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 154, at 558-59.
While a similar link could be at play in the possible chilling effect of electronic access on
cooperation, the question of whether cooperators have a protectable right of privacy in their
decision to cooperate with the government-either conceptualized as cooperators exercising some
right of association (by joining sides with the government) or making a personal decision about
the relationships they wish to protect (children or family, for instance) and those they do not
(former criminal associates)-is beyond the scope of this Article. Such a theory would be open to
the critique that the autonomy of such a choice is undermined by the inherently coercive aspect
of making a deal with the government when the alternative is a long prison term.
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While the Court upheld the statute as a reasonable exercise of
the police power, 172 it was "not unaware of the threat to privacy
implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information
in computerized data banks or other massive government files." 173
Justice Brennan concurred that "[tlhe central storage and easy
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for
abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future
developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such
74
technology."
2. The Modern View
Even before Whalen, the Court had begun to recognize some of
the dangers to privacy presented by the modern ability to compile,
maintain, and analyze data. The right to informational privacy was
given perhaps its most detailed review in the Court's cases dealing
1 75
with claims arising under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").
Although these cases did not deal with court records,1 76 the values at
stake were similar. In Departmentof Air Force v. Rose, 77 editors of the
N. Y U. Law Review sued under FOIA for access to case summaries of
honor and ethics hearings involving Air Force cadets, with personal
references and other identifying information deleted. 7 8 One of the Air
Force's rationales for denying access was that disclosure of the records
"would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."'179 The information had previously been distributed within
the Air Force Academy, but it had not been disseminated to the
public.180

172. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
173. Id. at 605. The Court later stated that its opinion in Whalen "recognized the privacy
interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye." U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769 (1989).
174. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
176. By its terms, FOIA does not apply to the judiciary. See id. § 552(f0(1) (defining "agency"
under FOIA as "any executive department, military department, Government corporation,
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory
agency").
177. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
178. Id. at 355.
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
180. "A case summary consisting of a brief statement, usually only one page, of the
significant facts is prepared by the Committee. As we have said, copies of the summaries are
posted on forty squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy, and distributed among
Academy faculty and administration officials." Rose, 425 U.S. at 359.
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While the Court upheld the release of the records,' 8 ' its opinion
is notable for the serious view it took of privacy. The Court
acknowledged that re-publicizing damaging information that might
have been "wholly forgotten" could be a separate harm, 8 2 observing
that "the risk to the privacy interests of a former cadet, particularly
one who has remained in the military, posed by his identification by
otherwise unknowing former colleagues or instructors cannot be
rejected as trivial."'183 The Court later referred to Rose as a case that
had "recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of
certain information even where the information may have been at one
' 84
time public.'
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press,8 5 the Court used the privacy concerns raised
in Rose to prohibit the release of an individual's rap sheet. 86 The case
made three important points. First, the Court reemphasized its view
that the fact that information may at one time have been public does
not scuttle an individual's privacy claim. 8 7 Second, the Court noted
the importance of the passage of time, as well as the way in which a
privacy claim is affected by compilation of information and increased
accessibility. 8 8 Third, the Court held that the purpose of FOIA was to
enable citizens to keep an eye on their government-the classic First
Amendment self-government rationale. 8 9
181. Id. at 382.
182. Id. at 380-81 ("Despite the summaries' distribution within the Academy, many of this
group with earlier access to summaries may never have identified a particular cadet, or may
have wholly forgotten his encounter with Academy discipline.").
183. Id. at 381.
184. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 767
(1989).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 780. In Reporters Committee, the Court considered the applicability of the FOIA
exemption that excluded records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, "to the
extent that the production of such [materials] ... could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. at 778-79 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
187. Id. at 763 ("[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass
the individual's control of information concerning his or her person. In an organized society,
there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another."). This surprisingly
modern view is championed by Solove. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 153, at 1457
("[C]ourts must abandon the notion that privacy is limited to concealing or withholding
information, and must begin to recognize that accessibility and uses of information-not merely
disclosures of secrets--can threaten privacy.").
188. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763-64 ("Plainly there is a vast difference between
the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.").
189. See id. at 773 (discussing the citizens' right to be informed about "what their
government is up to").
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In Reporters Committee, the media sought access to the rap
sheet of Charles Medico, an individual with ties to organized crime,
whose company "allegedly had obtained a number of defense contracts
as a result of an improper arrangement with a corrupt
Congressman."19 0 The respondents argued that because a rap sheet is
merely a compilation of otherwise public information, "Medico's
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of a federal compilation of these
events approaches zero."1 9 1 The Court rejected this "cramped notion of
personal privacy,"1 92 looking back instead to the informational privacy
interest it had identified in Whalen of " 'avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.' "193
In the Court's view, the private character of the information,
while potentially eroded by wide dissemination, could be restored by
the passage of time and the fading of memory. 194 The increased
accessibility represented by a "compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain
96
information"' 95 that "would otherwise have surely been forgotten"'
altered the balance that practical obscurity represented. In contrast,
the clear purpose of FOIA was to protect the "citizens' right to be
informed about 'what their government is up to,' ,197 and this purpose
was "not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens
that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals
little or nothing about an agency's own conduct."'198

190. Id. at 757.
191. Id. at 762-63.
192. Id. at 763.
193. Id. at 762 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 428 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
194. See id. ("Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law
rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which
the passage of time rendered it private."). Referring to its decision in Rose, the Court observed,
"If a cadet has a privacy interest in past discipline that was once public but may have been
'wholly forgotten,' the ordinary citizen surely has a similar interest in the aspects of his or her
criminal history that may have been wholly forgotten." Id. at 769 (citing Dep't of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-81 (1976)).
195. Id. at 764.
196. Id. at 771.
197. Id. at 773 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Henry Steele Commager, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7)).
198. Id. Again, the Court relied on Rose to support its point; in that case, the summaries
were material to an investigation of how the government operated, while the identifying
information about particular cadets was not. Id. at 773-74 ("The deletions [of identifying
information] were unquestionably appropriate because the names of the particular cadets were
irrelevant to the inquiry into the way the Air Force Academy administered its Honor Code;
leaving the identifying material in the summaries would therefore have been a 'clearly
unwarranted' invasion of individual privacy.").
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Ultimately, the Court held that there was a strong privacy
interest in practical obscurity itself1 99 and that a third party request
for law enforcement information about a private citizen would not only
be "reasonably ...expected to invade that citizen's privacy" but would
also be "unwarranted" if the request sought no official information
20 0
about a government agency.
Reporters Committee, Rose, and Whalen therefore reflect a
sensitivity on the part of the Court to issues of privacy that might be
broad enough to halt the march towards instantaneous disclosure of
all criminal court records over the Internet.

III. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC ACCESS
In discussing whether to limit Internet access to criminal court
records, it bears repeating that paper records remain accessible at
clerk's offices in every district. Electronic access is but an alternative
means of consulting these records, albeit a much more convenient and
economical one. Since neither the First Amendment nor the common
law mandates electronic access to court records, 20 1 courts are free to
evaluate electronic access as a matter of policy. 20 2 This issue has
garnered attention recently from the Justice Department, the Judicial
Conference, the media, and the public, providing an opportunity to
make meaningful improvements to the system.
A. The Instigator: Whosarat.com
The catalyst for the renewed debate on electronic access was
Whosarat.com, a website started by a federal defendant now serving a

199. See id. at 780 ("The privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet
information will always be high.").
200. Id. The Court recently reaffirmed its holding that the privacy interest "is at its apex"
when documents requested under FOIA concern private citizens. Nat'l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780). In
Favish, a unanimous Court held that Exemption 7(C) of FOIA prevented the disclosure of death
scene photographs of President Clinton's deputy counsel, Vince Foster. Id. at 174-75. The Court
reiterated its belief that FOIA functions as means for citizens to know "what their government is
up to." Id. at 171. It continued, 'This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.
It defines a structural necessity in a real democracy." Id. at 171-72.
201. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no right to
information in a particular medium).
202. The federal judiciary has been wrestling with this question for the past decade. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., REPORT ON PRIVACY AND
PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES A-3 (2001), available at www.uscourts.gov
[PressReleases/att81501.pdf.
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twelve-year sentence for distribution of marijuana. 2 3 Despite its
notoriety, the website is far from comprehensive. 20 4 It functions
primarily as a community bulletin board where individual members
post profiles of informants and undercover officers; 20 5 there is no
centralized attempt to mine information from PACER or other online
sources. 20 6 Anyone can pay the subscription fee and join the site, and
only members may post profiles of alleged "rats."20 7 These profiles
specify the cooperator or informant's name, alias, age, gender,
address, illegal activity, known drug use, and the agency or law
enforcement organization that uses the cooperator or informant. 20 8
Some of the profiles include a photograph, as well as links to the
cooperator's criminal record and any court documents the posting
member has found. At the time of writing, there were 4,610 profiles of
informants and cooperators posted on Whosarat.com, 2 9 of which 1,026
contained links to court documents. 2 10 Of these profiles, 873 profiles
203. Judgment at 1-3, United States v. Bucci, No. 03-10220 (D. Mass. July 26, 2007).
Revenues from Whosarat.com are helping defray the legal costs of his appeal. See Who's A Rat,
About Us, supra note 24.
204. It is, however, the largest and most professional-looking site of its type. The other
informant websites I visited either contained little information or were more overtly activist.
E.g., Belleville, Ontario, Rat Listings, http://www.geocities.comfbellevillerat/ (last visited Mar.
30, 2009) (displaying the tagline "Snitches get stitches"); RCMP Informants, http://rcmpsnitches
blogspot.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009) (containing only five profiles); Women's Anarchist Black
Cross, http://www.wabc.mahost.org/notsoconfidentiall.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009) ("Our goal
is not a punitive one, our goal is to eradicate one of the government's most devastating
weapons-The Confidential Reliable Informant.").
205. As the site explains:
Who's A Rat is a database driven website designed to assist attorneys and criminal
defendants with few resources. The purpose of this website is for individuals and
attorneys to post, share and request any and all information that has been made
public at some point to at least 1 person of the public prior to posting it on this site
pertaining to local, state and federal Informants and Law Enforcement Officers.
Who's A Rat, About Us, supra note 24. Under its category of "informants," the site lists both
cooperating defendants and paid informants. Id.
206. Data mining allows the extraction of discrete information from large databases, more
usually employed to reveal customer buying patterns, formulate marketing strategies, and more
recently, identify terrorism suspects. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, DataMining, and
Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2005).
207. Subscriptions cost $22.99 for six months or $7.99 per week. Who's A Rat, Membership
Page, http://www.whosarat.com/membership.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
208. Whosarat.com disclaims any connection with violence or retaliation. "This website does
not promote or condone violence or illegal activity against informants or law enforcement
officers. If you post anything anywhere on this site relating to violence or illegal activity against
informants or officers your post will be removed and you will be banned from this website."
Who's A Rat, About Us, supra note 24.
209. See Who's A Rat, supranote 22. There were only 445 profiles of law enforcement agents.
Id.
210. See spreadsheet on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review (information collected in March
2008).
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contained links to documents available through PACER, including 607
plea agreements and 141 government motions for downward
departure for substantial assistance. 2 11 Fifty-five of those profiles
2 12
contained links to the alleged cooperator's PACER docket sheet.
Despite the website's protestations that it does not condone or seek to
facilitate violence, it appears to capitalize on the widespread hostility
against "rats" and "snitches." Nonetheless, in spite of the Justice
Department's fears that Whosarat.com would increase retaliation
against cooperators, 213 there has only been one reported instance of
anyone using Whosarat.com to facilitate witness intimidation, which
2 14
was promptly prosecuted.
B. Recent Proposalsfor ElectronicAccess
1. Department of Justice Proposals
In its proposals to the judiciary, sparked by concern about
Whosarat.com, the Department of Justice focused on plea agreements
211. See id. It is notable that this represents only a small fraction of cooperator information
currently available on PACER. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
212. See spreadsheet on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review.
213. Violent retaliation against cooperators is a pervasive problem, of which cases where the
perpetrators are identified and prosecuted only represent a fraction. See, e.g., United States v.
Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (drug crew's code of vengeance mandated that
anyone cooperating with law enforcement "must die"); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336,
346-47 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (drug dealer entered into a cooperation agreement with the government
and was killed to prevent his testimony in a murder case); United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562,
570 (4th Cir. 2005) (witness in a murder trial was killed to prevent him from testifying); United
States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1035 & n.27 (11th Cir. 2005) (Colombian drug
traffickers allegedly murdered five people suspected of cooperating with American law
enforcement); United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir. 2000) (cooperating
witness was murdered by the defendant after the cooperator provided evidence in a drug
conspiracy case); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 925-26 (8th Cir. 1999) (defendant killed
a federal informant in order to prevent further cooperation with law enforcement against him);
Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (cooperating witness in a
narcotics case was shot two days before trial was due to begin); United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d
1251, 1254-57 (2d Cir. 1994) (mob boss ordered the murders of numerous associates suspected of
cooperating); United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1991) (cooperator was shot
by his codefendant after his cooperation with law enforcement was discovered); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 624 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (cooperating witness was murdered by the
defendant against whom he was going to testify); State v. Maynard, 316 S.E.2d 197, 216 (N.C.
1984) (cooperating witness agreed to testify pursuant to a plea agreement and was murdered to
prevent his testimony). Nor are reprisals limited to the informants and cooperators themselves.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) (mother was shot in
retaliation after her son cooperated with law enforcement in high-profile trials of gang
members).
214. The defendants pled guilty to witness tampering on April 2, 2008. Maryclaire Dale,
Couple Admits Witness Tampering in Whosarat.com Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 2008.
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as the primary vehicle for exposing the identity of cooperators. 215 Its
main proposal was to remove all plea agreements and corresponding
docket notations from PACER, leaving the documents available for
inspection at the courthouse. 2 16 This suggestion had the virtue of
treating all cases alike, thus avoiding any "red flag" issues. 21 7 But
while the Department's proposal closed one avenue by which
cooperation could be exposed, it did nothing to address the possible
exposure of cooperation through sentencing documents or docket
information not related to plea agreements. It was also the most
restrictive proposal in terms of public understanding; in the absence of
any docket notations on PACER regarding pleas, only a trip to the
2 18
courthouse would reveal whether a defendant had pled guilty at all.
The Department also offered four alternative proposals. 21 9 One
was that all plea agreements be filed electronically, but that Internet
access to these plea agreements would be limited to the court, counsel
for the defendant, and counsel for the government, with all unsealed
plea agreements available to the public at the courthouse. 220 Apart
from added convenience for the parties, this suggestion would have
had roughly the same effect as removing all plea agreements from
PACER, with the same costs and benefits.
Another proposal was that, upon the filing of a motion for a
protective order, the clerk of the court in each district would block
remote Internet access for particular plea agreements or other
221
documents containing sensitive information on a case-by-case basis.
While this would have been a less restrictive solution than blocking
access to plea agreements in all cases, it would treat cooperation cases
differently from non-cooperation cases and hence would create a "red
flag" problem. 222 In addition, just as for sealing, under the law of most
circuits the filing of a motion for a protective order would have to be
docketed and would therefore serve as another indication of
cooperation. 223

215. Comment of Kenneth E. Melson, Dir., Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, to the Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to
Electronic Case Files, Comment 65, at 2-3 (Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter DOJ Comment], available
at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
216. See Battle Letter, supra note 25, at 2, 7.
217. DOJ Comment, supra note 215, at 4.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 5-7.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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The Department of Justice also proposed that in all cases
prosecutors could file a generic plea agreement containing standard
and hypothetical references to cooperation. 224 If actual cooperation
occurred, "the prosecutor could notify the court of a defendant's
cooperation through a non-public document." 225 While this suggestion
would have homogenized cooperation agreements and ordinary plea
agreements, it would also have done away with even the limited
oversight the public currently has over the cooperation process. Under
this proposal, while all unsealed documents would remain available
over the Internet, they would serve little informational purpose
because they would hide whether a given defendant was cooperating
or not. 226 Indeed, because the actual terms of the agreements would be
filed under seal, they would not even be available at the courthouse,
further obscuring useful information. 22 7
The Justice Department's final proposal was the most
promising: a uniform system of tiered electronic access, restricting
certain documents to that defendant's counsel and the government,
making others available to a broader group of counsel, and releasing a
third category to the general public. 228 Under such a system, plea
agreements and other documents would be filed electronically, but
Internet access would be limited to the court, counsel for the
defendant, and counsel for the government. All unsealed documents
would remain accessible at the courthouse as before. This system has
the advantage of flexibility and security, although, like any system
with a large discretionary component, it could prove to be difficult to
administer and subject to abuse. 229 Some districts have already begun
to employ a system of access privileges, so it appears to be a workable
option. 230 This proposal, however, only addresses half of the equation:

224. DOJ Comment, supra note 215, at 6.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. This is the approach already taken in some districts, such as North Dakota. See supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
228. See DOJ Comment, supra note 215, at 6.
229. See id. (noting that this approach would place a greater burden on clerks' offices and
increase the risk of inadvertent error).
230. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, neither plea agreements nor sentencing
documents are accessible via PACER, and the docket sheet gives only generic information. See
Letter from Harvey Bartle III, Chief Judge, E. Dist. of Pa., to John R. Tunheim, Dist. Judge,
Dist. of Minn., in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic
Case Files, Comment 53, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.
gov/2007text.htm ("If this protocol saves one life or one prosecution or prevents one injury, our
court firmly believes our effort has been a success."). In the Northern District of Illinois, only
case participants can access documents filed in criminal cases over the Internet. See Electronic
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the risk to cooperators and the integrity of criminal investigations. It
does nothing to shed light on how the cooperation process is
administered across the country.
2. The "Public Is Public" Approach
Unsurprisingly, the majority of comments submitted to the
Judicial Conference, particularly those from the media, defense
lawyers, and the public, advocated a "public is public" approach, in
which electronic case files would enjoy the same level of accessibility
as paper files. 231 One private citizen summed up much of the proaccess argument: "If they are public files, then they ought to be public.
Period."232 This approach echoes the classic First Amendment
rationale that "public debate must not only be unfettered, it must also

Filing in the Northern District of Illinois: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ilnd.uscourts
.gov/PUBLIC/DktInfo/FAQ-CMECF.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
231. See, e.g., Comment of Alexander Bunin, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. Dist. of N.Y., to the
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public
Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 50, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm (asserting that the benefit of allowing citizens
access to public court documents outweighs the value of encouraging cooperation); Comment of
Mark C. Zauderer, President, Fed. Bar Council, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in
Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files,
Comment 62, at 4 (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm
(stating the Council's belief that if plea agreements are available to the public at the courthouse,
then they should also be available to the public on the Internet); MLRC Comment, supra note 26,
at 1 (urging the same); NAA Comment, supra note 26, at 11 (concluding that the federal
judiciary should provide the same electronic access to criminal plea agreements as is provided to
other court records); Comment of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al., to the
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public
Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 66, at 3 (Oct. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm ("The only way for the public to fully and fairly
evaluate the performance of court personnel is to review court records and to have full access to
court records."); NACDL Comment, supra note 26, at 3 (arguing that because many proceedings
can only be witnessed by those present in court, information should be published to the fullest
extent possible on the Internet). In addition, twenty-seven out of twenty-eight comments posted
by members of the public advocated open access. See, e.g., Comments to the Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic
Case Files, Comments 15-17, 20-22, available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm
(all opposing restricted online access).
232. Comment of Private Citizen, Minneapolis, Minn., to the Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts in Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case
Files, Comment 32 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http:// www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
The "public is public" approach has been adopted by several state courts in their own struggles
with online access. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON PUB. ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE 1 (2004), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/publicaccess
/ReportPublicAccessCourtRecords.pdf ("[lPublic access to court case records should be the
same whether those records are made available in paper form at the courthouse or electronically
over the Internet.").
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be informed." 233 What better way to inform the public than to give it
unlimited access to court records in the most convenient and fastest
form the world has ever seen? Apart from its enviable simplicity, this
argument has intuitive appeal: Why should we treat electronic records
differently than records in any other form? The information contained
in a cooperation agreement is the same, whether the agreement was
filed electronically or written with a quill and delivered to the
courthouse by a coach and four.
The "public is public" approach has been successful in the civil
context. When civil court records were first made available online,
there was widespread concern that the disclosure of sensitive personal
information in court documents, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, medical information, financial information, and
names of minor children, could lead to identity theft, credit card fraud,
or worse. 234 But the solution was relatively simple: such information
could be redacted from the court records without infringing on the
public's right of access. 2 35 As one commentator observed, "[T]he
general education that an individual might be expected to acquire
from the perusal of court records does not include committing to
memory the street addresses of fellow citizens, their Social Security
236
numbers, or their bank accounts."
The sensitive personal information contained in civil court
records could be separated from "[tihe adjudicatory facts upon which a
court relies to dispose of a case." 237 But in the case file of a cooperating
defendant, the sensitive personal information (that a particular
defendant is a cooperator) and the adjudicative information (that a
defendant is pleading guilty to a cooperation agreement) cannot be

233. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
234. See Silverman, supra note 12, at 207 ("[C]ertain categories of personal information
render a person particularly vulnerable to malfeasance and harm: these include a person's
address, telephone number, social security number, driver's license identification number, bank
accounts, debit and credit card numbers, and personal identification numbers (PINs)."); Lynn E.
Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing JudicialAccountability with Public Trust and
Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access Policies and a Proposal for South
Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 83 (2006) ("Apart from identity theft and credit card
fraud, public information in court records can be used to commit crimes involving blackmail,
extortion, stalking, and sexual assault.").
235. This practice has been codified by Rule 49.1(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1(a) (providing for
partial redaction from court filings of personal information, including social security numbers,
taxpayer-identification numbers, birth dates, name of minor children, financial account numbers,
and home addresses).
236. Silverman, supra note 12, at 209-10.
237. Id. at 209.
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disentangled. The personal information that can later be misused is
238
generated by the adjudicative process itself.
Proponents of the "public is public" approach point out that in
cases where there is a genuine concern that disclosure will jeopardize
an investigation or the safety of an individual, the information can be
sealed.2 3 9 While sealing has been the primary protective mechanism in
the paper world, its efficacy is undermined in an online setting. The
first problem is that sealing, like courtroom closure, cannot be a
stealthy process: to comport with due process it must call attention to
itself.240 Most circuit courts have concluded that sealing requires
notice to the public, and therefore that motions for sealing and sealed
documents should be listed on the docket sheet. 241 As discussed
above, 24 2 sealed documents on a docket sheet can serve as "markers" of
cooperation, a greater problem given the easy accessibility of docket
sheets on PACER.
In addition, because sealing should be limited to extraordinary
cases, where there is a risk of imminent harm to an individual or an
investigation, 243 it cannot counter the chilling prospect of worldwide
238. Attempting to redact the "cooperation paragraph" from the body of the plea agreement
will not be of much help, as one federal judge observed: "[Ain order to have the parties submit a
redacted plea agreement or to restrict public internet access to the plea agreement would have to
be docketed and would also serve as a red flag of cooperation." Comment of Kimba Wood, Chief
Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y., to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for
Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 2 (Aug. 31, 2007),
available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
239. See MLRC Comment, supra note 26, at 2 ("The MLRC asks the Federal Judiciary... to
adopt a policy requiring U.S. Attorneys to file plea agreements and cooperation agreements and
that the latter only be sealed by motion, for good cause shown, on a case-by-case basis."); NAA
Comment, supra note 26, at 11 ("[T]he judiciary should maintain its traditional case-by-case
approach, which does not preclude motions to seal names from all copies of a plea agreementelectronic and hardcopy-or motions to make certain plea agreements accessible only at the
courthouse."); NACDL Comment, supra note 26, at 7 ("To the extent such remedies can be useful,
moving the trial court to seal the plea agreement restricts specific knowledge of its terms from
publication.").
240. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("If the
constitutional right of the press and public to access is to have substance, representatives of
these groups must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion.").
241. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
243. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part)
(announcing test that defendant seeking closure must establish substantial probability that
irreparable damage to his fair-trial right will result from open proceeding, alternatives to closure
will not adequately protect that right, and closure will be effective in protecting against the
perceived harm); Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1988)
(applying test); Associated Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983)
(same); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v.
Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 560-62 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that "[t]he district court must make
specific findings to support its conclusion that other means will be insufficient to preserve the
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exposure on the Internet. And because sealing is supposed to be only a
temporary measure, 244 it is of no comfort to former cooperators once
their plea agreements and sentencing documents are unsealed.
C. How Electronic Information Is Different

1. Consequences for Privacy
Ultimately, the larger problem with the "public is public"
approach is that it fails to acknowledge that, measured against paper
records, electronic information has very different consequences for
privacy. Electronic information can be reproduced without limit at
minimal cost and without loss of quality; it can be accessed
simultaneously by any number of people anywhere in the world; and
once it has been disseminated, there can be no certainty that it has
been entirely deleted. 245 Compared to the information filed in folders
in clerk's offices throughout the United States, it is public to a degree
unparalleled in history.
In addition to its potential for limitless dissemination, the
other signal feature of electronic information is its state of permanent
availability. As Anita Allen writes, "Electronic accessibility renders
past and current events equally knowable. The very ideas of 'past' and
'present' in relation to personal information are in danger of
evaporating." 246 In cyberspace, there is no such thing as yellowing
paper, fading ink, or documents too hard to reach because they are
squashed at the back of a rusty filing cabinet. In this world,
247
summoning up the past is as effortless as clicking a mouse.
The rules that were developed to protect sensitive information
in the world of paper records represented a consensus as to the proper
balance between the competing interests of public information and
privacy, transparency and security. As one commentator pointed out,
defendant's rights and that closure is necessary to protect effectively against the perceived
harm"). Sealing is probably a lot more widespread in practice, as in my experience documents
could be sealed with nothing more than a pro forma statement that disclosure would "jeopardize
the safety of a witness."
244. "Even where a court properly denies the public and press access to portions of a
criminal trial, the transcripts of properly closed proceedings must be released when the danger of
prejudice has passed." United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 714 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing
Gannett, 443 U.S at 393).
245. While Internet pages can be taken down, there is no way of knowing whether the
information contained in them has not been copied many times over.
246. Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47, 62 (2008).
247. Id.
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applying the same rules to electronic records alters that balance,
privileging the free flow of information to the exclusion of other
interests. 248 Not everyone will be disturbed by this: one can make a
robust argument that the privacy of convicted felons and turncoats is
not a good that needs to be preserved. This kind of privacy is painted
as merely a desire to evade personal responsibility, or as Judge Posner
puts it,to have "more power to conceal information about [oneself]
that others might use to [one's] disadvantage." 249 At worst, privacy can
been seen as tantamount to cheating: if most people abide by social
norms in order to maintain a good reputation, "[t]he ability to conceal
discreditable facts about oneself permits one to acquire that benefit
' 250
without having to pay the full behavioral price.
But other values achieved by protecting privacy could answer
these objections. One of these is a sense of community with our fellow
citizens. At the most universal and benign level, everyone makes
mistakes and commits acts they would just as soon forget. To distance
themselves from regrettable past acts, people "need to be safe from
memory: they need to forget and need others to forget, too." 251 This
need for beneficial forgetting is complicated in the case of cooperators,
whose mistakes and bad acts may be of greater magnitude than those
of the average, law-abiding citizen. But "[p]eople grow and change,
and disclosures of information from their past can inhibit their ability
to reform their behavior, to have a second chance, or to alter their
life's direction." 252 In Reporters Committee, the Court echoed its earlier
observation in Rose that there may be a privacy interest in bad acts
long forgotten: "If a cadet has a privacy interest in past discipline that
was once public but may have been 'wholly forgotten,' the ordinary
citizen surely has a similar interest in the aspects of his or her
criminal history that may have been wholly forgotten. ' 253 The Court

248. See Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 315 (2004) ("When the same
rules that have been worked out for the world of paper records are applied to electronic records,
the result does not preserve the balance worked out between the competing policies in the world
of paper records, but dramatically alters that balance.")
249. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1981).

250. BeVier, Privacy Protection,supra note 155, at 470. For former cooperators, however, the
"good reputation" that risks being tainted by disclosure is that of being a "stand-up guy"someone who would rather go to prison than cooperate with the government. The people most
disadvantaged by this reputational "fraud" would presumably be those engaged in criminal
behavior.
251. Allen, supra note 246, at 57.
252. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 154, at 533.
253. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769
(1989) (discussing Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976)).
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therefore ascribed legal significance, even positive value, to the act of
forgetting. Even a convicted felon, implied the Court, should be able to
254
leave the past behind.
2. Consequences for Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is another reason to allow a cooperator to escape
being branded a felon and a rat. Constant access to a person's criminal
past is unlikely to have a positive effect on potential rehabilitation.
While the goal of rehabilitation may not enjoy the theoretical
ascendancy it once did, 255 in practical terms it remains a social value.
The United States claims the world's largest prison population 256 and
pumps thousands of ex-convicts and cooperators back onto the streets
every year. 257 Creating a "criminally stigmatized underclass screened
out of legitimate opportunities, steered towards criminal careers and
further incarceration 258 only reinforces this cycle.
Courts have long recognized the link between rehabilitation
and the anonymity that could gradually be regained in a world of
practical obscurity. In Melvin v. Reid, later discredited, 259 a former
prostitute who was acquitted of murder had gone on to a respectable
260
married life until her story and maiden name were used in a movie.
254. In any event, felons remain subject to a whole host of disabilities under state and
federal law. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 & n.1 (1971) (noting that a convicted
criminal may be disenfranchised, lose the right to hold federal or state office, be barred from
entering certain professions, and disqualified from serving as a juror); Brian K. Pinaire et al.,
Barred from the Bar: The Process, Politics, and Policy Implications of Discipline for Attorney
Felony Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 290, 292 (2006) (finding that convicted felons may
also lose firearms privileges, public benefits such as housing and food stamps, and eligibility for
certain federal student loans).
255. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 5 (1981) (discussing the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s).
256. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2008, at Al (noting that while the United States has less than five percent of the world's
population, it houses almost a quarter of the world's prisoners).
257. In 2006, the federal government released 47,920 inmates from prison. See WILLIAM J.
SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISON INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2007, at 4 tbl.4 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf.
258. Jacobs, supranote 20, at 387.
259. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
260. Id. at 91. Dean Prosser put it best:
The plaintiff, whose original name was Gabrielle Darley, had been a prostitute, and
the defendant in a sensational murder trial. After her acquittal she had abandoned
her life of shame, become rehabilitated, married a man named Melvin, and in a
manner reminiscent of the plays of Arthur Wing Pinero, had led a life of rectitude in
respectable society, among friends and associates who were unaware of her earlier
career. Seven years afterward the defendant made and exhibited a motion picture,
called "The Red Kimono," which enacted the true story, used the name of Gabrielle
Darley, and ruined her new life by revealing her past to the world and her friends.
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The court held that the defendants' use of the plaintiffs real name
was actionable, particularly in light of her efforts to rehabilitate
herself.261 "One of the major objectives of society, as it is now
constituted, and of the administration of our penal system, is the
rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of the criminal," wrote
the court. 262 "Where a person has by his own efforts rehabilitated
himself, we, as right-thinking members of society, should permit him
to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw him back into a
life of shame or crime. 2 63
This principle was extended to a convicted, rather than
acquitted, felon in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, also since
overruled, 264 in which the court held that the plaintiff, who had been
convicted of truck hijacking eleven years earlier, had a valid cause of
action against a magazine for using his name. 265 The court
acknowledged that criminals can be the object of legitimate public
interest soon after a crime is committed, but that this interest fades
with time. 266 Even though Briscoe's conviction had been a matter of
public record, the court found that with the passage of time, he had
267
regained an expectation of anonymity.

Prosser, supra note 163, at 392.
261. See Melvin, 297 P. at 93-94 (finding that the filmmakers could properly have used
incidents of the plaintiffs life which were part of the public record, but not her true name in
connection with the incidents). Melvin became one of the bases for the tort of publicity given to
private life in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D,
cmt. k, illus. 26 (1977) (describing a situation very similar to that of the plaintiff in Melvin and
concluding that the acts "may be but [are] not definitely an invasion of privacy").
262. Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
263. Id.
264. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d. 552
(Cal. 2004).
265. Id. at 40.
266. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, cmt. c).
267. See id. at 41 ("One of the premises of the rehabilitative process is that the rehabilitated
offender can rejoin that great bulk of the community from which he has been ostracized for his
anti-social acts.").
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While Melvin and Briscoe no longer have legal force, 268 they
still have normative appeal. "It would be a crass legal fiction to assert
that a matter once public never becomes private again," noted the
Briscoe court. "Human forgetfulness over time puts today's 'hot' news
in tomorrow's dusty archives. In a nation of 200 million people there is
269
ample opportunity for all but the most infamous to begin a new life."
When it made this observation, the court was expressing not only a
view of information that may now seem quaint, but was also making a
point about the beneficial nature of limited information.
Now that "crass legal fiction" has become a reality. In a world
of imperishable, easily accessible criminal court records, the former
cooperator can truly become "a prisoner of his recorded past."270 In
some areas of the law, courts have deemed that such a burden is
acceptable. 2 71 Sexual offenders, for example, can constitutionally have
their identities and criminal pasts disseminated to the communities in
which they live under state and federal Megan's Laws; most states
allow this information to be posted on the Internet. 272 But this is a
narrow class of cases in which the courts have found that concerns for
public safety outweigh the offenders' privacy claims, and their high

268. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the First Amendment prohibits the
sanctioning of publication of true information contained in public records. See Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that the press could not constitutionally be exposed to
tort liability for truthfully publishing the name of a rape and murder victim released to the
public in official court records); see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (invalidating
state statute imposing damages on newspaper for publishing name of rape victim); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979) (holding that a state criminal statute prohibiting
publication of juvenile offenders' names violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Okla.
Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308 (1977) (per curiam) (invalidating district court order
enjoining newspapers from publishing name and picture of juvenile offender). Briscoe was
therefore overruled and Melvin discredited. See, e.g., Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160,
1162 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (stating that Melvin was "dead").
269. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 41.
270. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 154, at 112.
271. Some courts see no problem with the disclosure of "legitimately discreditable
information about a person, such as his criminal record," particularly if that person is running
for office. Willan, 280 F.3d at 1163 (holding that a mayoral candidate had no claim against law
enforcement officers for disseminating his criminal history, which included a prior burglary
conviction).
272. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90-91 (2003) (upholding Alaska's Megan's Law, which
requires sex offenders in the state to register information with authorities, including their
names, addresses, and crimes of conviction, which the state then posts on the Internet). Many
other states provide online access to their sexual offender registries, and one site,
www.familywatchdog.us, provides visitors with the ability to conduct national searches across
state registries. Family Watchdog Registered Offenders Search Page, http://www.
familywatchdog.us/Search.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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recidivism rates offset offenders' desire for rehabilitation. 273 The
situation of cooperators, who have committed a range of criminal
offenses, is considerably more ambiguous. 274 They are the only exoffenders who have been publicly acknowledged as rendering a service
to the government. Unsavory though many cooperators may be, the
government may owe them some kind of obligation to ensure that
their assistance is not later turned against them when they attempt to
275
reenter society.
D. Towards a New Role for ElectronicAccess
Given the dual nature of the problems raised by Internet
access, any attempt to ameliorate these difficulties would have to
address both the specter of cooperator retaliation and the disarray
surrounding the use of cooperators. No solution will be perfect, as any
initiative has its costs, and any proposal can become obsolete as
technology continues to evolve. Nonetheless, it is worth trying to work
our way out of the current impasse. The proposed framework that
follows is such an attempt.
1. Limiting Unwarranted Exposure
The Department of Justice's proposal of a system of tiered
access privileges seems to be a good starting point to address the first
problem: retaliation. Internet access to docket sheets and case
2 76
documents on PACER could be limited to the parties and the court,
while all non-sealed documents would remain available for inspection
273. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that "[t]he public
interest in knowing where prior sex offenders live" outweighs any privacy interest offenders
might have in preventing disclosure of their home addresses); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d
466, 476 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting high rates of recidivism and egregiousness of sex crimes as
impetus for registering and monitoring sex offenders); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1091
(9th Cir. 1997) (noting that Megan's Laws alert "the community to the presence of sexual
predators adjudged likely to offend again").
274. This is all the more so as empirical research supports the thesis that the older the
criminal conviction, the less likely it is to be predictive of future criminal conduct. See Megan C.
Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Short-Term Predictions of Criminal
Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 64, 71-73 (2007) (concluding that "the more distant the last
evidence of criminal activity is in the past, the less likely there is to be a meaningful elevation in
the hazard rate for new offenses").
275. While such a responsibility is not grounded in a legal duty, it seems appropriate as a
matter of fair play.
276. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text; see also Winn, supra note 248, at 325
(suggesting that access to criminal court records be controlled through a system of privileges
whereby judges, law clerks, and defense attorneys and prosecutors have full online access in
specific cases, while members of the press could have access on consent of the parties).
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at the courthouse.2 7 7 This would help curtail exposure of cooperators'
identities over the Internet, which should ease concerns about
increased retaliation attributable to remote accessibility of electronic
court records.
Of course, even the tightest limits on electronic access cannot
protect against all leaks of cooperator information. 278 Every prosecutor
who investigates targets capable of violence is haunted, to a greater or
lesser degree, by her own imagined Billy Costigan scenario. If these
fears make her hesitate to file an explicit cooperation agreement that
might be read by a target online, the question becomes less one of
provable harm than of how the possibility of harm, however remote,
shapes behavior. Cooperators cannot be insulated completely from
27 9
retaliation, short of being placed in the Witness Protection Program.
But if the examples of deliberate obfuscation in the districts of New
Hampshire and North Dakota are anything to go by, the concern that
a cooperator's identity will be exposed on the Internet is a potent one.
One counterargument to this proposal is that even if electronic
access was curtailed, nothing prevents a motivated individual from
physically visiting the clerk's office and reviewing the court files of a
suspected cooperator. Equally, a more enterprising version of
Whosarat.com might send runners to the courts to scan criminal case

information into mobile devices for subsequent dissemination online.
While these risks will always exist so long as there is a right of access

277. This proposal might arguably fall afoul of the E-Government Act, which requires the
federal courts to provide public access to information over the Internet. See E-Government Act of
2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2006) (directing each federal court to establish and maintain a
website that contains or provides links to court information, including access to docket
information for each case, the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, documents
filed with the courthouse in electronic form, and "[alny other information.., that the court
determines useful to the public"). So far, however, it appears that the courts believe that they
can limit electronic access to court files under their supervisory power, see Nixon v. Warner
Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), and no court has yet interpreted the E-Government
Act as limiting their discretion to manage their own records. Cf. Winn, supra note 248, at 318
(finding the E-Government Act "indicates a congressional deference to the courts to be
responsible for the management and oversight of their own records"). Certainly the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Illinois have not let the E-Government Act
stop them from suspending public access to criminal case files. See supra note 230 and
accompanying text.
278. There are many sources of cooperator exposure, of which court files are only one part.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. This suggestion is not intended to be an answer to the
larger problem of witness intimidation.
279. And even that has its limits. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 624
(Former 5th Cir. 1982). In Thevis, the cooperator, a small-time mob associate, was scheduled to
enter the Witness Protection Program, but wanted to conduct one last business transactionselling a piece of property-before he did. Id. He was shot to death by the defendant, along with
the person to whom he was showing the land. Id.
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to court records, 280 if nothing else, raising the costs of access can slow
this process and lessen the risks of cooperators' identities being
discovered online. To the extent that placing limits on electronic
access could protect even a small number of cooperating defendants
from unnecessary exposure, and more importantly, reassure
prosecutors and courts that cooperation bargains can be conducted
more openly, it is still worth attempting.
Such a proposal is likely to displease those who insist that the
public's right of access includes electronic access to every case. 28 ' As
one member of the public put it, "The public's need to know far
outweighs the needs of those made uncomfortable by scrutiny. How
else can the public be informed about what's going on?" 28 2 This is a fair
question, but it begs another: What is the information of value that
the public needs to know? Does the public need to know that an
individual indicted for distributing five kilograms of cocaine, which
would ordinarily entail a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years, 28 3 cooperated with the government and received a sentence of
thirty-six months, or does it need to know that Billy Costigan, in
particular, cooperated with the government? In the vast majority of
federal narcotics, weapons possession, extortion, and fraud cases, the
truly valuable information is not the name of the cooperator, but what
information was traded to reduce the cooperator's criminal liability
and achieve a sentence that might be years shorter than the one
attached to the offense of conviction.
The other difficulty with a rule limiting electronic access to the
litigants and the court is that such a rule would need exceptions,
particularly in cases of high public interest where the names do

280. Indeed, they have always existed, minus perhaps the development of technology to
enable people to secretly photograph or scan court records while examining them at the clerk's

office.
281. See, e.g., NAA Comment, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing that the public, through press
reports about individual plea agreements, gains insight not only into the functioning of the
judicial system, but also "the substance of specific court proceedings"). The NAA did not explain
why access to specific court proceedings was an important interest, but contented itself with
saying that in criminal cases, "the public interest in learning the particulars and the results of
individual cases is obvious." Id. The NAA then listed nine news reports to illustrate the use of
plea agreements in news coverage, all of which included some significant aspect of public
corruption, bribery, corporate fraud, terrorism or the involvement of a prominent sports figure.

See id.
282. Comment of Private Citizen, Wayland, Mass., to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in
Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files,
Comment 29 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
283. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (setting a term of imprisonment no less than ten
years for distributing five kilograms of cocaine).
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matter.28 4 In high-profile cases, the usefulness of electronic access-its
ability to ease the administrative. burden on court personnel, facilitate
the fact-gathering of news outlets, and increase the public's own
ability to seek out information-militates against limitation. That
said, "high-profile" is not a category susceptible to easy definition.
Such an exception could obviously encompass cases where the public
interest was at stake, such as cases of public corruption or bribery of
governmental officials, 28 5 but would become more difficult to define
when the celebrity of the defendant or the heinousness of the crime
merely piqued the public's interest. A possible bright line could be
drawn between those cases that go to trial and those that do not. In a
case headed for trial, discovery obligations require that the
government disclose all impeachment material relating to its
witnesses, including cooperation agreements, 2 6 therefore the
marginal difference in having the information posted on the Internet
would be negligible. Because reporters and the public will probably
attend most of the court proceedings anyway, it makes little sense to
limit accessibility to paper files at the courthouse.
For cases that do not go to trial, someone would have to decide
what criteria should determine what is high-profile and whether a
case was high-profile or not. As a preliminary matter, these questions
would probably be best answered by the district judge presiding over
the case, considering the totality of the circumstances and input from
284. During a two-year moratorium on access to the content of criminal case files on PACER,
though not to docket information, initiated in 2001, the Judicial Conference carved out an
exception for extremely high-profile criminal cases that placed extraordinary demands on clerks'
offices, such as the prosecution of the "20th hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui. See Press Release,
U.S. Courts, Web Sites Help Courts, Public in High-Profile Cases (May 22, 2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroomlhighprofilecases.htm (indicating that the Moussaoui pages on
the website of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia were viewed 350,000
times).
285. Jack Abramoff, the lobbyist at the center of several recent public corruption scandals,
who cooperated with the government and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, is a
frequently-cited example. See MLRC Comment, supra note 26, at 2 ("The scandal with which
Abramoff was involved goes to the heart of democratic government ....
); Comment of Michael
E. Stowell, Attorney at Law, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in Response to Request for
Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Comment 24 (Sept. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm ('The recent plea agreements in
public corruption cases such as the Abramoff ... caseo have revealed government involvement,
by elected officials and other public officials, in activities which should be scrutinized.");
Comment of Private Citizen, Marble Rock, Iowa, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in
Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files,
Comment 35 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm ("Plea
agreements in cases involving governmental misconduct are part of the 'sunshine' brand of
disinfectant that helps us keep our democracy healthy. The name 'Jack Abramoff comes to
mind.").
286. United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 428 (2d. Cir. 1985).
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the parties. 28 7 In formulating its own high-profile exception, the
Judicial Conference determined that in order to obtain the "highprofile" exemption, "[c]onsent of the parties would be required as well
as a finding by the trial judge.., that such access is warranted under
28 8
the circumstances."
Nonetheless, the foreseeable difficulties of formulating and
administering exceptions to a regime of limited Internet access pale in
comparison with the potential gains in terms of halting the trend
towards prosecutorial evasion and loss of legitimate information.
Limiting online access to criminal court records, which would curb the
incentives for prosecutors to hide the nature of the bargains they enter
into with cooperators, could at least maintain the level of information
currently available to the public.
2. Increasing Public Oversight
No matter what limits are placed on electronic access, there
remains the vexing issue of how to achieve meaningful oversight of
cooperation practices. The cooperation system remains "a great source
of dishonesty and evasion and a still uncertain amount of
unwarranted disparities among individual defendants." 28 9 As
discussed above, the lack of information as to how cooperation is
administered within and among the districts, 290 coupled with a lack of
standards and guidance to inform prosecutorial discretion, have
undermined the goals of sentencing uniformity and fairness. Instead,
these ideals have been replaced by the reality of hidden, unprincipled,
29 1
ad hoc decisions by individual prosecutors.

287. Factors might include the likelihood of retaliation if cooperation was revealed, the
nature of the crime charged, the nature of the public interest, and the privacy concerns of the

litigants.
288. U.S. Courts, Judiciary Privacy Policy, Limited

Exceptions to Judicial Conference

Privacy Policy for Criminal Case Files (adopted March 2002), available at http://www.privacy.
uscourts.gov/LimitedExceptions.htm. This could be supplemented by a requirement that consent

not be unreasonably withheld.
289. Weinstein, supra note 32, at 617.
290. For years, scholars, judges, and practitioners have called for data to be collected. See,
e.g., Bowman, supra note 37, at 65 (calling for a "careful internal study of current practice");
King, supra note 68, at 306 (recognizing the need to improve data collection); Marcus, supra note

45, at 8 (contending that such data is "absolutely critical to informed decision-making'); Saris,
supra note 16, at 1051-52 (discussing disparity concerns).

291. As William Stuntz has observed, "The real law of crimes and sentences is the sum of
those prosecutorial choices. That law is nearly opaque; even those who study the criminal justice
system for a living know very little about it." William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal
Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2569 (2004).
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The open access advocates are right to demand greater public
oversight into the federal criminal justice system, particularly in the
subterranean area of cooperation agreements. Where they are wrong
is in their method of achieving reform. Insisting on Internet access to
cooperation agreements simply triggers fears of retaliation,
encouraging prosecutors to find ways to avoid creating a paper trail,
which in turn creates the risk of even greater disparities and
increasingly ineffective review.
Nearly twenty years ago, Graham Hughes proposed a
mechanism for review of cooperation decisions that would require
prosecutors to file the details of their plea and cooperation agreements
with a public commission that would periodically examine and report
on these agreements. 92 Cooperation agreements deserved special
scrutiny, Hughes argued, precisely because they were not
standardized or governed by a consistent set of rules. Protection of the
public interest and fairness in the administration of justice were thus
implicated "with a special sharpness." 293 Because of the power of the
government over such agreements, Hughes found that a cooperator's
fate under a particular cooperation agreement was "an important
index of the fairness and integrity of the prosecutorial system." 294 A
review process, he believed, could help develop standards and criteria
to measure what the cooperator would have to do in order to fully
cooperate, as well as what actions would constitute a breach of that
295
agreement.
While the increased flow of direct information to the public has
obviated the need for the commission Hughes envisaged, the spirit of
his proposal remains relevant today. The best way to disentangle the
sensitive personal information from the adjudicatory facts in a
cooperator's case 296 is to organize the information differently, outside
the confines of a criminal case file containing a specific person's name.
If the traditional way of making cooperation agreements public has
been to seal, redact, or otherwise hide the terms of the cooperation
bargain, a far more enlightening alternative would be to disclose
cooperation agreements with the explicit terms of the bargain intact

292. Hughes, supra note 4, at 20.
293. Id. at 21. Hughes also noted that cooperation agreements were different from ordinary
plea agreements in that the possibility of sentencing leniency that accompanied a cooperation
agreement often bore no relation to the cooperator's culpability. Cooperation agreements could
therefore risk licensing continued criminal activity. Id.
294. Id. at 40.
295. Id. at 21-23.
296. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
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but the personal identifying information excised. 29 7 Since most
government agreements are boilerplate, the agreements should be
released in the context of anonymous defendant "profiles" accessible
directly by the public. Each defendant profile, which could be
organized by the type of crime charged, could include (1) a copy or a
statement of the initial charges; 298 (2) all subsequent and superseding
charges; (3) plea documents; (4) an indication of whether the
29 9
defendant cooperated, and if so, the substance of his cooperation;
and (5) sentencing information. If the defendant did cooperate, the
30 0
cooperation could be sorted into one of four general categories:
3
0
1
providing background information,
agreeing to testify, providing
testimony, or taking active part in an investigation. Finally, it would
be helpful to note the race and gender of the defendants (and possibly
the targets) in order to monitor the disparities earlier recognized by
302
the Sentencing Commission.
Overall, such a system would help identify charge
bargaining, 303 reveal the frequency of cooperator breaches, enable
comparison between cooperation outcomes and the outcomes of
"straight" pleas, and give an overview of what type of cooperation
leads to what sentencing reductions across districts. In this way, the
computerization of the federal courts could give the government an
opportunity to shed light on its cooperation practices without
triggering fears of increased retaliation or a massive loss of individual
privacy.
One practical question is who should be tasked with reporting
this information. Because prosecutors are in the best position to collect
information and report on their own cases, the most obvious choice
would be the line assistants who sign up the cooperators. They could
297. The fact that there would be anonymity for the individual line assistant making the
bargain as well as for the defendant could encourage candid reporting.
298. In many cases, criminal complaints can be very fact-intensive, containing information
such as conversations captured on wiretaps, detailed descriptions of physical surveillance, or
specific events reported by confidential sources. If the complaint cannot be redacted sufficiently
to protect the anonymity of the case, or would be meaningless without the specific identifying
information such as names, places and dates, it might be better replaced by a simple statement
of the crimes charged and a general description of the facts.
299. This would replace disclosure of the government's substantial assistance motion,
another typically fact-intensive document, which, if redacted to remove identifying information,
would probably be unintelligible.
300. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 7 (describing categories of cooperation).
301. This category could be further subdivided into provision of background information or
information leading to search warrants or arrest warrants.
302. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
303. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 59, at 516 ("[Olur best window on potential
circumvention is to trace the differences between indictment charges and conviction charges.").
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be responsible for redacting any markers identifying the target, the
cooperator, or the assistant, and for organizing the information into
relevant categories. A periodic reporting requirement 3 4 would lessen
both the administrative burden on the assistants and the chances that
interested individuals could "decode" the defendant profiles and
identify cooperators. There remains the risk that some prosecutors
will continue to reward sympathetic defendants even where no
assistance is given and simply certify that the defendants provided
"background information." But the sense of greater public scrutiny, at
a minimum, will remind prosecutors of their accountability and could
305
encourage more honesty.
Such a proposal is not likely to be met with unmitigated
enthusiasm by the government. No bureaucrat-line assistants
included-welcomes the thought of more paperwork, particularly a
new reporting requirement without which they have managed quite
nicely for years. Yet, realistically, the Department of Justice and the
U.S. Attorneys' offices are faced with a choice. Public opinion is almost
universally against removing plea agreements from PACER, and, for
the moment, the Judicial Conference is not taking steps to do so,
leaving the decisionmaking to the individual districts. While certain
30 6
districts have taken steps to limit access to criminal court records,
many more simply post all their files on PACER. 30 7 If the Department
wants to convince the courts to limit the information on PACER,
proposing a good-faith alternative might help overcome public
resistance.
There are also several benefits to the government from this
reporting proposal. Individual line assistants might be encouraged to
think through their decisions more carefully. The awareness that their
charging decisions will be made public, even if not directly
attributable to them, might increase a sense of professionalism. It
might also provide guidance to the well-meaning assistant who is
unsure what to do. The decision whether to "sign up" a defendant to a
cooperation agreement is not an easy one. Assistants frequently find

304. Depending on the district's caseload, quarterly or yearly reporting might be appropriate.
305. Better information would help prosecutors "develop a self-image of independence and
fairness that can be a guarantor of liberty. .... A proper understanding of the power they wield,
and its quasi-judicial nature, should facilitate this development." Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2150 (1998).
306. See supra note 230 (discussing practices in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
307. See David L. Snyder, Note, Nonparty Remote Electronic Access to PleaAgreements in the
Second Circuit, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1263, 1307 (2008) (listing sixty-five districts that make
plea agreements available on PACER to the same extent that they are available at the
courthouse).
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themselves under pressure from agents who often want to sign up
defendants in the shortest time and with the fewest proffer sessions
possible.3 08 Substantial assistance motions can also be made
enthusiastically or grudgingly,30 9 and the choice between these
extremes is often made with only cursory input from supervisors, who
might be distracted by their own cases. Awareness of how prosecutors
in other offices make decisions in similar circumstances, or even
having a better sense of how their colleagues in the same office
operate, should encourage more thoughtful determinations by line
assistants.
The benefits to the public could also be considerable. Even with
all the advances in technology, there has never been a systematic
overview of what cooperation deals are made in particular types of
cases, and how they compare to "straight" pleas in similar cases.
Making this information available for study and debate would be an
important
step
towards
encouraging
greater
prosecutorial
accountability, avoiding unfair results and arbitrariness, and bringing
greater rationality to the process. As one member of the public wrote
to the Judicial Conference: "Access to these agreements provides the
American people with a window into a contract that is being made
with a defendant on behalf of the American people." 310 Such a
reporting requirement would provide everyone-courts, litigants, the
public, the press, and scholars-with a much clearer view.
If we are to take seriously the promise of well-informed public
debate on the justice system in general and the practice of cooperation
in particular, we should be able to make the information about "what
the government is up to" available in a way that does not conflict with
law enforcement concerns and the privacy rights of the cooperators
themselves. The student editors in Rose were onto something-they
wanted to conduct a study of the Air Force's disciplinary proceedings
without infringing on the privacy of the cadets or the integrity of the
Air Force's process. Their request for the case summaries without
identifying personal information permitted them to achieve both goals.

308. Once the cooperator has been fully debriefed, agents often have little patience with
Columbo-like assistants who schedule additional proffers just to probe every contradiction.
309. While in the Eastern District of New York, cooperators were only violated if they had
clearly lied or committed another crime since signing the cooperation agreement, cooperators
who had been economical with the truth early in the process or had committed other bad acts
would usually receive a "warts and all" 5K letter, informing the judge of everything, good and
bad, the cooperator had done of which the government was aware.
310. Comment of Private Citizen, Portland, Ore., to the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts in
Response to Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files,
Comment 30 (Sept. 13, 2007), availableat http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007text.htm.
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We can build something similar for plea information in the criminal
justice system generally-we have the technology.
CONCLUSION

The grant of electronic access to criminal files in the federal
courts is likely to disappoint those who hope it will usher in a new era
of governmental accountability. Spurred by fears of retaliation against
cooperating defendants and a consequent hampering of law
enforcement efforts, prosecutors and courts will find ways of
concealing the terms of cooperation bargains reached. Information
that was at least somewhat helpful when it was practically obscure
now risks being degraded beyond legibility once it is released over the
Internet. One possible way to reverse this trend would be to limit
access in exchange for an organized reporting system that concealed
only the names and other identifying information of the defendants
involved. This would answer the serious privacy concerns raised by
imperishable electronic records and give the public more insight into
the nature of federal plea bargains.
The use of cooperating defendants, one of the most difficult law
enforcement techniques to regulate and possibly the most susceptible
to arbitrary application, could then endeavor to become more
transparent and more fair, both through self-policing by U.S.
Attorneys and through public oversight.

